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This is a study of how American prisoners of war
organized themselves in North Vietnam. Basically, this
study seeks to explore what variables were significant in
influencing the behavior of men captured and incarcerated
in adverse conditions during an unpopular and controver-
sial war. Although every war produces moral and politi-
cal issues as well as heroes and victims, the purpose of
this study avoids such questions which have been raised
in many other mediums. Instead, this study is an attempt
to ask analytical questions of an experience and to
determine if the responses correspond to developments in
organizational theory. In short, this study analytically
elaborates the author's experiences as a prisoner of war
in the perspective of organizational theory.
Statement of the Problem
Most of the works already published by former
prisoners of war are narrative accountings of their
experiences. In these accounts, many of these men
credited the communication system as a major factor which
helped them survive their captivity. At present, how-
ever, no one has attempted to analyze and assess how an

organization with a communication system was developed
and maintained in the prisons of North Vietnam where
communication between groups of prisoners was strictly
forbidden. Moreover, no attempt to date has been made
to integrate various viewpoints of former prisoners of
war with the established concepts of organizational
theory. What notions or fragments of organizational
theory did these men find most useful in reconstructing
a social order? In short, the problem can be simply
stated by two questions: (a) How did prisoners of war
organize and maintain a communication system when such
activity was so restricted? (b) What were the signif-
icant variables which helped explain the control mechan-
isms in such an organization?
M. W. Riley (1963, p. 184) suggests that the first
aspect of such a problem can be approached by observa-
tion, while the second more "subjective question" merits
a process of questioning. Therefore, this study is not
only a description of the organization but also a reflec-
tive articulation of the pattern of feelings, attitudes,
role expectations, and interrelationships among the
members. As such, this research is an exploratory case
study which seeks to make explicit what remained implic-
itly understood in the everyday life of a prisoner of
war. Then, and only then, can one more readily see how

the bits and pieces of knowledge used by prisoners of
war fit into the larger framework of existing theory
which has been called the Principles of organization
(Caplow, 1964)
.
Definition of Terms Central to This Study
The definitional problems of any study concerning
such concepts as authority, power, influence, control,
and leadership are immense. Before the objectives and
specific propositions of this study can be clearly under-
stood, some operational definitions are in order.
Social scientists have fought a long and arduous
battle over the meaning of these terms. Some writers
(March & Simon, 1958) have even omitted using such ambig-
uous words as leadership from their work. Essentially
there are three ways to approach the subject of author-
ity, leadership, power, and influence. First, some
writers use the terms power, authority, and influence
interchangeably (Bennis, 1959, p. 260; Mechanic, 1962,
p. 350) . Secondly, many theorists view authority as a
special case of power or influence. For example, Katz
and Kahn (19 66, p. 22 0) define authority as "legitimate
power," while Bierstedt (1950, p. 736) views it as
"institutionalized power." Thirdly, some scholars have
considered authority as a relationship between individ-
uals and groups which is developed through an ongoing

process of legitimization. Barnard (1938) , Blau (1964)
,
Peabody (1964), and Simon (1957) have all followed this
third way. In the final analysis, most writers view
authority as concerned with an organizational position,
and leadership as a more general term which relates to a
person.
,
Authority: For the purpose of this study, authority
relates to position and the legitimate right (as defined
by just claims through the operation of law, custom, or
any ongoing process of human activity) to issue orders
inherent to that position. A -position is "a point (loca-
tion) in organizational space defined by one or more
roles" (Katz & Kahn, 1966, pp. 179-180). A vole, in
turn, is defined as "an organized set of behaviors
belonging to an identifiable office" (Mintzberg, 1973,
p. 54) . In the prisoner-of-war situation, the most
identifiable office was the Senior Ranking Officer (SRO)
who tried "to organize other men and to set important
precedents for resistance" (Schein, 1958, p. 328). This
study develops how the expectations of this role were
formed, sent, received, and performed by many individ-
uals. An important point to note here is that some SROs
were strong leaders while others were at best indifferent
or colorless. But all SROs had authority.
Power: The terms of influence, control, and power

are easily confused. Influence is the broadest term
which relates to "virtually any interpersonal transaction
which has psychological or behavioral effects" (Katz &
Kahn, 1966, p. 220). Power "refers to potential acts
. * . the capacity to influence" (Katz & Kahn, 1966,
p. 220). In this sense, power is a latent force which
when released results in influence and at times control.
Control is successful influence such as the workings of
a well coordinated traffic controller at an airport. An
example of these three terms will clarify the issue.
If you are enjoying the scenery on a mountain road
and a speeding car approaches from behind, you might pull
to the side of the road to let him or her pass if the
honking horn and close presence on your tail annoy you.
In this case, the speeding car has exerted control if the
driver actually wanted to pass you. However, suppose you
feel his or her behavior was inappropriate and you desire
to take some kind of action. You continue to plod around
the curves and when you enter a passing zone, you accel-
erate so rapidly that the impatient driver behind you
cannot pass. Such would be a case of influence without
control. In either situation, your position ahead of
the speeding motorist gave you the power to control the
car behind you, which in turn could indubitably influence
your behavior by honking and following you too closely.

French and Raven (1968) identified five sources of
social power as follows: legitimate, reward, coercive,
referent, and expert. This study seeks to expand this
typology with the addition of information as another
source of power because its influence was repeatedly
observed in the prisoner-of-war setting. Information is
not included in expert or referent power because it does
not depend upon a person or on one's credibility;
instead, information as an influence is taken at face
value as being logical, rational, and plain commonsense
truth. Stanley (197 3) contends that "in every society
persons perceive some objects, events, situations, and
so forth as intrinsically right or wrong, coherent or
meaningless, necessary or optimal" (p. 403). Thus,
information rests on the presence of self-evident knowl-
edge.
Behavior: Influence and control focus on behavior
and attitudes in this study. Given a social situation,
the result can follow basically two courses—obedience or
deviance. Within these two areas, however, there is a
wide range of acceptance or rejection. Three types of
acceptance have been identified by Aronson (1972, pp. 27-
38) as compliance, identification, and internalization.
Compliance is that type of response which is based on the
person's desire to be rewarded or to avoid punishment.

Identification is behavior which is adopted in order to
place an individual "in a satisfying, self-defining rela-
tionship to the person or persons with whom he [or she]
is identifying" (Aronson, 1972, p. 28). The attractive-
ness of the identity and not his or her immediate pres-
ence is the key to this response. Internalization is
that behavior which is based upon a person's own deep-
rooted system of values. "The motivation to internalize
a particular belief is the desire to be right. Thus, the
reward for the belief is intrinsic" (Aronson, 1972, p.
29) . As such, internalization is "the most permanent,
most deeply rooted response" (Aronson, 1972, p. 29) and
best fits into "legitimate power" (French and Raven,
1968) . Likewise, there are a number of actions open to
members in any society to reject control. These are
ignoring receipt of orders, changing orders to fit one's
own needs, appeals to higher authority for support, open
rejection, and finally resignations (Peabody, 1964,
p. 115)
.
Organizational Structure: The structure of any
organization resists any precise ideal or pure definition
such as attempted by Weber (1947). Instead, this study
uses the concept that organizational structure exists
along a continuum. Burns and Stalker (1972, pp. 250-252)
describe the polarity of this range as "mechanistic" and

8"organic"; the former is hierarchic with differentiation
of functional tasks, while the latter form is involved
with continual redefinition of tasks through negotiated
interaction and little emphasis on positions. Organic
structure implies individual responsibility for the over-
all task in contrast to mechanistic form stressing
obedience to superiors. Burns and Stalker (1972) state:
The mechanistic structure is appropriate to
"stable conditions" like the routine of clerical
bureaucracies, while the "organic" form is best
suited to changing conditions which give rise
constantly to fresh problems. (pp. 250-251)
The prisoner-of-war organization was mechanistic in that
the hierarchy of military rank was a vertical alignment
of authority which stressed obedience of orders from
higher ranking officers, especially the SRO. However,
because an organization is mechanistic does not dictate
a rigidity of form. Burns and Stalker (1972, p. 253)
mention the elastic quality of structure which allows an
organization to fluctuate within a range on the mecha-
nistic/organic continuum. For example, a mechanistic
organization could become more or less participative and
thus, more or less organic in its structure. This study
not only will show this structural elasticity but also
will seek to develop a relationship between structure
and uncertainty. In short, the structure of the
prisoner-of-war organization in Hanoi was observed to

become more mechanistic in times of great uncertainty.
Communications: The field of communication studies
is replete with examples of the denotative and connota-
tive levels of communication. Birdwhistell (1974) des-
cribes the difference as "between information theory
which is about messages and their transmission and com-
munication theory which is about interconnectedness and
its maintenance" (p. 206) . This study explores both
levels of theory and stresses the sense of community
which can arise from the maintenance of a communication
system and the influence which can develop from informa-
tion.
In discussions concerning the pattern of communica-
tions, this study uses the original terminology of
Bavelas (1968) with one important addition of the all-
channel network from Guetzkow and Simon (1955) . Figure 1
presents five geometric patterns (all-channel, circle,
chain, "Y", and wheel) with the dots denoting members of
the system and the lines representing linkages. In the
all-channel pattern, (a) , each participant can communi-
cate with any other member of the group. In the circle,
(b) , an individual is restricted to communication with
only his neighbor on each side, but unlike the chain,
(c) , the circle has no ends. In the "Y" pattern, (d)
,
one central member has three potential communication
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points while in the wheel, (e) , the central member is
like the hub of a wheel and is the only member who can











The five communication patterns
used in this study
Communications Technology: The primary technology
employed by prisoners of war in communicating in North
Vietnam was the tap code, a modification of the railroad
code used before the introduction of Morse code. Tap
code uses the letter "C" for the letter "K" and thus can
break the alphabet into a five-by-five matrix (see Fig.
2) . The key letters are "AFLQV" which were easily
remembered by new prisoners by the adage "Air Force Likes
Queer Virgins." The first series of tapping vertically
identifies the row, and the second series denotes the
column and thus pinpoints the letter. For example,
three taps followed by two taps is the letter "M."
In order to expedite communication, many abbrevia-
tions were used; and commonly used words such as "no"
(one tap) and "yes" (two taps) were reduced to short
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signals. Tap code was basic and could be sent by exer-
cising or waving one's arms in a meaningful rhythm.
Some men used to sweep messages when they were cleaning
the courtyard before a guard. Voice code was a vocal
adaptation of the tap code in which one cough was one,
two coughs two, a throat clearing three, a hack (the
noise emitted when saliva is forcefully brought up the
esophagus) four, and a spit or sneeze five. Therefore,
the letter "M" in voice code was one throat clearing
followed by two coughs. Although voice code was less
effective than tapping on a wall, it was occasionally
the only means available for reaching prisoners in
remote areas where there was no common wall or founda-
tion to act as a conductor for sound.
A B C D E
F G H I J
L M N P
Q R S T U
V W X Y Z
Figure 2
The five-by-five matrix of tap code
Major Actors in This Study
The major actors of this study were observed in
three prisons: Little Vegas, Camp Unity, and the
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Plantation. These names were widely used in the
prisoner-of-war system and are employed throughout this
study to identify the setting.
Ernest C. Brace
Brace was a civilian pilot employed in a U.S. AID
program to supply remote camps on the Laotian/Thailand
border. He was captured in May of 1965 approximately
fifty miles from Thailand in northern Laos. His North
Vietnamese captors marched him over 300 miles to Dien
Bien Phu, where he was kept for three and one-half years.
In 1968, he was brought to Hanoi and made contact with
Americans in the, "Plantation. From this point on, Brace
was an avid communicator and helped the prisoner-of-war
organization in both his example and ingenuity. This
author became Brace's first roommate in 1969 and spent
the duration of the war with him.
Lieutenant Colonel Ted Guy
Colonel Guy was known as the "Hawk" and provided
strong leadership as the SRO of the Plantation in 1971
and 1972. He received wide publicity upon his return to
the United States when he pressed legal charges against
eight former prisoners of war. However, the case was
never brought to trial.
Lieutenant Colonel Jim Hughes
Hughes was the roommate of Commander Jim Stockdale
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at Little Vegas in 1970. Their differences over communi-
cation reportedly caused Stockdale, the camp SRO, prob-
lems in performing his role. When separated, Hughes
became more active in communication and attracted atten-
tion and much criticism from other prisoners for his
erratic ranting at the North Vietnamese.
Lieutenant Colonel Robin Risner
Shortly before his capture, Risner had received
publicity on the cover of Time in 1965 and was according-
ly treated with close attention by his captors. Many
prisoners considered him to be the highest ranking
prisoner of war because he had already been selected as
a full colonel. However, Risner was still officially a
lieutenant colonel at the time of his capture. He often
served as SRO and provided many men with inspiration and
hope in times of great uncertainty and doubt.
Commander James Stockdale
Stockdale was the highest ranking naval officer
captured by the North Vietnamese. In March of 1976 he
was awarded the Medal of Honor for his resolute resist-
ance in the face of torture which has left him permanently
handicapped. Known affectionately as "Chet" by prisoners
who likened his walk to the character of Chester on the
television show "Gunsmoke," Stockdale was a good example
of strong leadership in an authority position; he often
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acted as SRO when others more senior to him refused to
assume the risks which accompanied the acceptance of the
SRO role. When not in command, Stockdale remained an





Historical Basis for the
Study of Authority
The development of a literature on authority inevi-
tably begins with Weber (1947) whose work stands as the
classic on bureaucracy. Weber's focus is on the claim
of legitimacy which he divided into rational-legal,
traditional, and charismatic types of authority. The
rational-legal authority type rests on the formal,
impersonal order of positions which characterize modern
corporate structure. From Weber's (1947) perspective,
this rational-legal authority type is "the most rational
means of carrying out . . . control over human beings"
(p. 337) . Although Taylor (1947) never specifically
discusses authority, an implicit tenet of scientific
management is that central coordination can determine
the "one best way" to achieve the most efficient means
of production. Gulick (1937, p. 7) condenses and focuses
organizational theory onto this quest for an authority
structure which will guarantee an effective system of
communication and control. Hence, the conventional
approach to authority stresses the impersonality of
office which controls through a hierarchy of positions
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and achieves efficiency by examining each person's func-
tion and by designing an appropriate task to his or her
function.
In contrast to the conventional approach, the human
relations school stresses the informal and subjective
aspects of human interaction which in their view explain
how organizations function. The writings of Mary Parker
Follett (1940) and Elton Mayo (1946) are the foundation
upon which this school of thinking rests. This human
relations approach created a deep division among organi-
zational theorists and thus clearly presented alterna-
tives to the functional and structural emphasis of the
conventional approach. There were attempts to reconcile
these vastly different approaches as early as Barnard's
study of the executive and his job (19 38) . However, the
works of Blau (1956, 1963, 1964), Katz and Kahn (1966),
March and Simon (1958) , and Simon (1957) face the issue
of converging the theoretical schools of thought more
squarely. Bennis (1959) and Peabody (1964) give excel-
lent reviews of this development and present typologies
for describing the essential differences between these
various approaches to the study of organizations. In
addition, Peabody (1964, p. 35) examines empirical case
studies on organizational authority along a continuum
from temporary small groups to total institutions such
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as prisons. This study focuses on the end of the contin-
uum with military and prison organizations, for these
types of organizations most nearly resemble the prisoner-
of-war situation. In fact the prisoner-of-war organiza-
tion is a unique type which perhaps falls somewhat beyond
the prison administrations normally found in the United
States because the prison management in North Vietnam had
many more options available for coercing and breaking
the will of their prisoners.
The literature on governmental and military bureau-
cracy is extensive, but one question appears nearly
universal to all these studies. Why do subordinates
obey their superiors? Presthus (1958) maintains that the
cultural environment trains an individual toward compli-
ance: "From infancy on, the individual is trained to
defer to authority" (p. 57). Presthus' study of the
Turkish coal industry confirms this emphasis on cultural
values and socialization (1961, p. 24) . Selznick (1963)
also contends that from the very start of life, every
individual "is conditioned to respond in socially deter-
mined ways" (p. 63). Thus, a core concept in sociology
is the socialization processes which build group values
into an individual. Caplow (1964) identifies ten modes
of socialization as follows: schooling, training,
apprenticeship, mortification, trial and error,
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assimulation, co-option, conversion, anticipatory social-
ization, and screening (pp. 172-178) . The key quality of
this process is its continuation throughout the entire
life of an individual. In the military, Dornbusch's
(1955) study of the Coast Guard Academy and Janowitz's
(1960) analysis of military career patterns are classic
accounts of how socialization processes are utilized by
the American military forces. Kaufman (1960) used a
similar analysis in a larger organizational context.
Yet, one disadvantage of this explanation and concept is
its weakness in analyzing deviance from the expected
norms
.
When resistance to authority occurs, the concept of
a continual definition of the latitude of authority is
useful. Barnard (1938) recognized the subordinate's
role in an authority relationship by his idea of a "zone
of indifference" (pp. 168-169) . Leighton (1964) recog-
nized this zone in his study of the administration of a
Japanese relocation camp and concluded that "in the long
run it is the governed who determine the governing of
men" (p. 367). In keeping with this analysis, Simon
(1957) enlarged this concept and called it a "zone of
acceptance" (pp. 133-134) . An employee "in joining the
organization accepts the authority relation" (March &
Simon, 1958, p. 57). At the same time, Blau (1963)
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shifted his thinking from authority through sanctions
(p. 220) to a description of authority as a process
which springs from social interaction vice formal organ-
ization (1956, p. 71). This viewpoint was supported by
parallel studies of two welfare agencies (Blau & Scott,
1962) . Moreover, the analysis of job content into pre-
scribed and discretionary tasks by Newman and Rowbottom
(1968) follows an increasing trend in organizational
theory to recognize the definition of authority from
both the superior's and the subordinate's viewpoint.
In relation to military organizations, a similar
development has occurred. Smith (1949) best represents
the early thinking which noted high ranking officers'
emphasis on authority through the use of sanctions (p.
Ill) . On the other hand, Janowitz (1959) recognized
that military organizations "must shift from reliance on
practices based on domination to a widening of manipula-
tion" (p. 482) , which he defined as group pressure and
interpersonal competence. In the terminology of French
and Raven (1968) , expert and referent power must replace
coercive and legitimate power. Peabody (1964) recognizes
this distinction with the terms "formal" versus "func-
tional" authority (p. v) . Formal authority is legitimate
and relates to position, while functional authority
relates to competence and effectiveness in interpersonal
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relationships. Recent developments in regard to group
dynamics have placed increasing emphasis on what Peabody
(1964) has called functional authority. Bennis, Benne,
and Chin (1969) reflect the glowing optimism of the
sixties when organic structure and participative manage-
ment was viewed by many as a cure for the malaise infect-
ing modern complex organizations. But there is emerging
evidence that there is no panacea for the ills of bureau-
cracy (Meyer, 1972; Mintzberg, 1973; Smith & Jones,
1968)
.
Cartwright and Zander (1968) present an excellent
treatment of the overall topic of group dynamics in
which many articles contain sophisticated quantitative
rigor and analysis. Although Thibaut and Kelley (1959)
confine their study to groups of two or three, their use
of mathematics to quantitatively measure power is useful
from the standpoint of dependence needs. Furthermore,
Smith and Jones (1968) studied the role of an interaction
influence system in a planned change and quantitatively
found no evidence to support the spread of influence to
lower participants when there was more interaction in an
organization (p. 181) . Such a finding is in keeping with
a quantitative analysis of governmental agencies by
Meyer (197 2) which found that no matter what program of
change is established by an authority, there are
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contravalling forces within the organizational structure
which seek an equilibrium. Thus, "organizations are more
stable than changing" (Meyer, 1972, p. 119). Still the
conclusion of Burns and Stalker (1972) stands as follows:
"The beginning of administrative wisdom is the awareness




A central issue of this study emerges from Selz-
nick's (1948) theory of "cooperative" systems and
Mechanic's (1962) study of informal power sources.
Selznick (1948) contends that informal patterns of influ-
ence are a spontaneous inevitability "based on personal
relationships, and are usually directed to the control
of some specific situation" (p. 32) . Mechanic (1962)
maintains that informal power is not necessarily derived
from "personal characteristics, although these may be
relevant, but results rather from particular aspects of
their location within their organizations" (p. 350).
Mechanic (1962) relates organizational power to access
to "persons, informations, and instrumentalities" (p.
352) ; a person gains access to these variables the
longer he or she is a member of the organization.
Mechanic (1962) closely examines the various sources of
power for lower participants and offers a number of
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hypotheses concerning the formation of informal power.
Since there is a wealth of work on personal attributes as
a source of power, this study uses Mechanic's hypotheses
concerning location and, more specifically, seeks to show
how position and information can influence and even con-
trol an organization such as in a prisoner-of-war camp.
Communications
Bavelas (1968) presents an experimental framework
for communications research used by Sidney Smith and
Leavitt. Of the two experiments, Leavitt's (1958) is
one of the most interesting and clearest studies concern-
ing the importance of location. Students randomly
divided into groups of five were given a simple problem
to solve as a group. Each group was positioned in a
pattern of a circle, chain, "Y", or wheel by use of
partitions. Then each member was given five symbols
from a total of six. The group communicated with mes-
sages and attempted to determine the symbol common to
all members of the group. After numerous problems, each
participant answered a questionnaire about his feelings
toward the positions in the group and his progress
during the experiment.
From the solutions to the above problem, Leavitt
(1958) found significant differences between the pat-
terns. For instance, "the circle showed no consistent

23
operational organization" (p. 553) , and "the wheel was
considerably faster (at its fastest) than the circle"
(p. 554) . From the questionnaires, Leavitt (1958) saw
great satisfaction and leadership in the central posi-
tions and just the opposite in peripheral locations. He
concluded that "centrality, then, is a function of the
size of the pattern as well as of its structure" (p. 559) .
In other words, the circle has an even distribution, no
leader, much activity, and satisfaction; the wheel repre-
sents the other extreme between which are the chain and
the "Y" patterns. The closer one moves to the wheel, the
more satisfaction the central position attracts, and the
more dissatisfaction arises in the peripheral positions.
In a further refinement of Leavitt 1 s (1958) experi-
ment, Guetzkow and Simon (1955) used 56 groups of five
participants each to explore whether the superiority of
the wheel was due to the pattern itself or the time it
took the members of each group to organize into a system.
The results of their experiment showed that an all-
channel network was just as effective as the wheel, once
the optimal organizational pattern was discovered.
Guetzkow (196 8) refined this work further by examining
"the mechanisms involved in the establishment of certain
persons in particular positions" (p. 517) , and found the
individual's ability to differentiate roles to be as
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significant a factor as the personal characteristics of
intelligence and ascendance (p. 520) . In another study,
Guetzkow and Dill (1957) found that groups seem to prefer
a minimum series of linkages. Therefore, Dubin (1959)
concludes from the above studies and his own research
that the lesser the number of communication linkages, the
greater the efficiency of the groups in performing tasks.
Caplow (1964, p. 264) sees many possibilities for organ-
izational engineering in Dubin (1959) if, and only if,




The above experimental work on communications and
its importance to organizations receives much support
from case studies of prisons and hospitals. A central
thread which binds a number of these studies together is
that when the position of a person or group of people in
an organization gives access to information or other
people, that individual or group has informal power and
can influence or even control the organization. From
Leavitt's (1958) laboratory to the harsh realities of
prison, the location or position with access has power.
McCleery (1972) describes a case where the guard force of
a prison "lost its monopoly over communication channels




In another study of prisons in Hawaii, McCleery (1968)
found similar significance in communication patterns but
in this case the prison management used communications to
its advantage. "Without the support of such communica-
tion patterns, the nominal authority of position was
meaningless" (p. 129) . Hazelrigg (1968) offers several
examples of organizational conflicts in prisons which
support the source of informal power as location within
and access to a communication system.
For precisely the same reason as above, a number of
hospital studies have shown similar consequences of com-
munication patterns upon formal and informal power. In
Scheff's (1961) study of organizational conflict, hospi-
tal attendants achieved control over administrative
policy. Since they were the only group who had complete
24-hour access to the wards, the physicians and adminis-
trators were dependent upon these attendants for infor-
mation about and control of the wards. This structure
gave the attendants sufficient power to turn aside a
serious reform program initiated by the formal authori-
ties. Thus, their actions controlled the organization.
The limits of informal power are noted most explic-
itly by Crozier (1964) who describes "a conflictive
equilibrium" between expert and subordinate powers in
which there is a rather stable "war of position"
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(p. 170). This equilibrium closely parallels Meyer's
(1972) description of bureaucracy. Sykes (1956) also
depicts the limits of informal power by his idea of
reciprocal agreements. Minor infractions are tolerated
by the guards, and in return the prisoners do not create
any major disturbances like a riot. Goffman (1961)
qualifies this exchange by noting that any violations
which are suspected to involve escape or revolt as an
objective are reported immediately because the first and
underlying goal of the prison or mental hospital is
security (p. 186). Hence, much of the empirical
research to date has served to clarify abstract concepts




One of the most crucial facets of a formal study is
the methodology employed by the researcher. In other
words, "the success of ex post facto explanation is a
function of the 'process analysis'" (Bell, 1964, p. 853).
This chapter develops what the specific objectives of
this study are and what methods were used to reach these
objectives. More specifically, procedures for the con-
struction of the theoretical framework and internal
questioning in the study are fully elaborated. Finally,
this chapter describes several limitations of the
approach used in this study and seeks to show how this
study applies to organizations and society in general.
Objectives of the Study
This study addresses two specific areas of interest
in the formal study of organizational theory: (a) the
consequences of communications for organizations and (b)
the role of formal authority. More specifically, the
focus of this study centers on structural elements within
the organization which influenced and at times controlled
the behavior of many prisoners. Such an approach is in
contrast to a psychological study which might delve into
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the personalities of each individual within the organiza-
tion. Hence, this study is an exploratory search for
variables which might explain what made the prisoner-of-
war organization in Hanoi work. As Schutz (1963) and
Stanley (1973) have cogently argued, what people refrain
from doing is equally as important as what they actually
do. Therefore, the dependent variable of this research
is both the attitude and behavior of the prisoners, while
the independent variables fundamentally are the role of
authority and the centrality of position.
The objective of this study is not to conclusively
prove the significance of any one variable or to quanti-
tatively measure or speculate on the amount of explained
variation that an independent variable might add to total
understanding. Rather, the primary objective hereof is
to provide some insight into the nature of this organiza-
tion without constructing a quantitative means to dupli-
cate the research, but at the same time avoid mere
speculation. In fact, the value of empirical research
does not lie in its ability to be repeated but instead
centers on the elucidation of experience in such a
manner that a third person can understand or gain an
insight into the experience without actually living it.
A noted example of such research is provided by Leighton
(1964) who described the administration of a Japanese
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relocation camp in World War II. Another advantage of
this approach is that "qualitative descriptions often
serve the important purpose of dealing with the social
system in the round" (Riley, 1963, p. 22). By such an
approach, one can better achieve an overview of the situ-
ation. Finally, the value of this study with these
objectives is its analytical clarification of a unique
experience which could never be realistically simulated
in an experimental setting.
The Theoretical Framework
The basic advantage of using theory in this study
is that it provides a basis for asking key questions
which help to uncover the implicit elements and variables
in an organization. These variables are often so subtle
that they are either taken for granted or completely
overlooked. The virtue of theory is that it exposes the
assumptions; it makes explicit the implicit. Moreover,
by examining concrete experience in relation to theoret-
ical and experimental findings one can better understand
the abstract conceptualizations advanced by many organi-
zational theorists. Hence, the benefit of this research
is that it sheds new light on some old ideas about
organizations and also helps to explain how prisoners of




The initial works used to formulate a theoretical
framework for this study were Caplow (1964) , Leavitt
(1958), Peabody (1964), Simon (1957), Tannenbaum (1968),
and Thompson (1967) . These authors were chosen because
of the comprehensiveness of their approaches and the
attention they give to authority, communication, and
organizational structure which directly pertain to the
objectives of this study. From these works, specific
propositions were examined on the basis of their applic-
ability to the organization of prisoners of war; and
from the remaining hypotheses and propositions, a number
were chosen for their relevance to the author's experi-
ences. For instance, there are many statements concern-
ing goals and coalition behavior in the literature.
Since the author was never in a large group, observations
of coalition behavior were not as direct as those of one
who had been in a large cell with several factions.
Therefore, this issue was discarded from this discourse.
However, as many propositions as were directly relevant
to the author's experience are discussed and include the
following.
1. The one-way relationship of "functions determine
structure" (Tannenbaum, 1968, p. 34) is examined in light
of structural changes in prison life.
2. When the functions of the organization changed,
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there were corresponding changes in the informational
content of messages within the system.
3. "In periods of crisis, formal authority is
magnified" (Peabody, 1964, p. 137).
4. "When the individual believes that his [or her]
cause/effect resources are inadequate to the uncertainty,
he [or she] will seek to evade discretion" (Thompson,
1967, p. 119) . Barnard (1938) observed this process as
a widening of subordinates 1 zones of indifference which
is the latitude of control granted to those in authority.
5. "The more sources of uncertainty or contingency
for the organization, the more bases of power there are
for power and the larger the number of political posi-
tions in the organization" (Thompson, 1967, p. 129).
6. "There is a direct relationship between the
amount of effort a person is willing to exert in an area
and the power he [or she] can command" (Mechanic, 1962,
p. 359).
7. "Other factors remaining constant, the more
central a person is in the organization, the greater is
his [or her] access to persons, informations, and instru-
mentalities" (Mechanic, 1962, p. 361).
8. The more central the position, the more satis-





From these eight propositions, the original frame-
work of this research was formed and then expanded to
other more detailed studies. For example, both the
concept of role theory (Katz & Kahn, 1966) and the
hypothesis of minimum linkage (Dubin, 1959) were valuable
tools for gaining insight into the working of authority
and centrality of position in the organization. More-
over, a broad survey of the literature on bureaucracy as
presented in the preceding chapter gives a historical
perspective to this study and also helps to obtain a
general overview of the development of organizational
theory.
Internal Methodology
Most research involves the construction of a
systematic way to collect data (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 478)
.
Since in this study the bulk of the data is in the
author's memory bank, a critical part of this work is
the process by which data are drawn and used. Kerlinger
(1973) describes such a process as "internal criticism"
and stresses its importance on the validity of any
historical study (p. 702) . To enhance both the reliabil-
ity and validity of this study, notes written immediately
upon the author's release have been continually checked
in addition to examining every work published by former
prisoners of war in the Vietnam War. However, such a
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procedure per se is not enough. In addition, the litera-
ture presented in two years of formal education at the
graduate level has been employed to construct a theoret-
ical framework and to interpret specific events. The
question "Does this work apply to the prisoner-of-war
organization?" was constantly used.
From this incessant inquiry, four questions emerged
which were helpful in interpreting any experience.
First, an experience which could better illustrate the
hypothesis or proposition under study was searched for.
In short, was this the best example to use? Secondly,
any experience relating to the issue being examined that
might tend to refute the point was sought. Thirdly,
interpretations based on other concepts such as Homans
'
(1950) exchange theory or Berne's (1961) transactional
analysis were explored for the purpose of insuring that
the approach of this study was best suited to explaining
what people had on their minds in the prisoner-of-war
situation. Finally, the disadvantages or costs of
personal interpretations were estimated in relation to
the benefits; and where the costs exceeded the benefits,
the interpretation was dropped in favor of a more plaus-
ible interpretation. For instance, role theory and
authority did not adequately explain deviant behavior
whereas the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger,
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1957) appeared to be very applicable. Whenever an expe-
rience is interpreted or used as an example to support a
proposition, these four questions were asked, and their
answers at times appear in the interpretation.
Limitations of This Study
The limitations of this study are that it cannot be
repeated and that the bulk of the data source comes from
the author's memory, assisted by notes written directly
after his release in March of 1973. Therefore, the
chance of a forced or inappropriate interpretation is
great. In an effort to reduce this limitation, an exam-
ination of every work published by former prisoners of
war in the Vietnam War was made in order to consider
different viewpoints. For example, Coker (197 4) and
Dramesi (1975) present different perspectives about the
issue of escape. Since both men escaped from prisons
in Hanoi and were recaptured, their opinions were valu-
able evidence and useful tools for looking at the organ-
ization of prisoners of war, the role of authority, and
the function of communication. As Riley (1963, p. 72)
has clearly stated, whenever the researcher takes a role
in the organization, the risk of a biased viewpoint is
present. Hence, the above methodological procedures
were constructed to help reduce this risk.
Since exposure to the theoretical literature did
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not precede the author's captivity, no hypotheses or
propositions regarding communication or authority pre-
ceded the collection of the data. Thus, stimuli were
received uninfluenced by rigid conceptualizations about
organizational theory except those general notions incul-
cated through socialization processes of the United
States culture and the United States Navy. According to
McKenney and Keen (1974) , this type of information
gathering is "receptive" vice "preceptive" and carries
the risk of failing "to shape detail into a coherent
whole" (p. 81). Hence, the careful construction of a
theoretical framework and the logical and consecutive
reasoning of the case study approach was adopted in order
to achieve a systematic overview of the organization.
Although the formulation of analytical questions may
reduce the chance of a hasty or inaccurate interpreta-
tion, the inherent problem of personal bias remains.
Yet, the rigor of these questions which serve as a
filter appears strong enough to increase the validity of
each experience and subsequent analysis used in this
research.
The limitations of the case study approach have
been addressed in many sources concerning research
design. Kerlinger (1973) stresses the inability to
control variables and the lack of randomization. Riley

36
(1963) focuses on the control effect produced by the
presence of the researcher and on the factor of personal
bias. In extolling the virtue of the experimental
method, Aronson (1972) distinguishes between mundane and
experimental realism. Aronson (1972) contends that
through good design and highly deceptive procedures,
experiments can be so realistic that the subjects 1
response will be genuine (pp. 2 80-2 81) . The primary
advantage of this experimental approach is that the
researcher can randomly assign subjects to the experi-
mental and control groups. Although it is impossible to
randomly assign the general population to the prisoner-
of-war setting, some analysis of the sample is illuminat-
ing.
Most of the Americans captured and eventually
released in the Vietnam War were officers. Rowen (1973)
reports that of the total of 564 military men released,
only 71 were enlisted personnel (p. 13) . There were
also 2 3 civilians released, but most of these men had
had prior military service. A large proportion of the
officers were involved in the flight of operational air-
craft, while a majority of the enlisted men were a part
of either helicopter or special forces operations. The
point here is that the prisoners of war in Vietnam came
from a unique and highly educated population—the career
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military. However, the actual selection process of
becoming a prisoner of war from this population appears
to date to have been a random process because most air-
craft in the Vietnam War were lost to barrage antiair-
craft fire and indiscriminate small arms. Hence, an
underlying assumption which has yet to be disproven is
that the prisoners of war in the Vietnam War were random-
ly selected from a rather unique population of military
career men.
Since the incarceration of the author was unplanned,
the limitation of control effect also seems to be rather
small. In the end, the major limitation of this study
is the risk of personal bias leading to an inaccurate or
forced interpretation in order to make a good fit to the
existing body of theory. The theoretical framework and
filter of methodological questions hopefully have enhanc-
ed the process and quality of evaluating the data. If
this study can reveal the expectations and intentions of
the prisoners of war in Hanoi in such a manner that one
can gain insight into this unique experience without
actually living it, then the quality of "mundane realism"
may more than offset the limitations of personal bias,
uniqueness of the population, and the chance of an inap-
propriate interpretation. The question which remains is:
"What can insight into the prisoner-of-war organization
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in Hanoi contribute to organizational theory?"
The Applicability of This Study
The ramifications of prison and hospital studies
are many. However, does a sample drawn from such a
population as a prison of criminals really apply to
society at large? Although mental institutions and
prisons consist of inmates rejected by society, scholars
in the field of psychology and sociology have discovered
concepts which apply to organizations as a whole. Goff-
man (1961) identifies common characteristics of "total
institutions" which make them unique, but at the same
time he also reveals how many aspects of life inside
such an institution is like society in general (p. 4)
.
McCleery (1968) hypothesizes one step further:
For the purposes of the study of relationships
between communications and authority, the prison
may be considered as a society in microcosm and
a source of insights into the nature of power
structures in other settings. (p. 117)
Since the population of prisoners of war was mostly
composed of officers, the socioeconomic background and
educational level of this group are far different than
the criminal elements which make up American prisons.
Hence, study of this organization and its communication
system may be even more revealing than other empirical
studies of total institutions. After all, it would be
difficult to consider these men society rejects, or, on
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the other hand, as any elite collection of heroes. In
fact, the diversity and mixture of people in the
prisoner-of-war camps of North Vietnam were immense.
Dramesi (1975) describes the composition and activities
of his group at Camp Unity:
Some were jumping, some were running in place,
others were doing push-ups, and a small group
practiced their handstands. The communicators
were writing notes to be passed later in the
day. And some scribbled on toilet paper pre-
paring for the Spanish or French lessons.
John McCain shook his head saying, "The
folks back home will never believe it!" For
such a small group, the variety of ideas,
activities, and personalities was fantastic.
No two people did anything the same way.
(p. 218)
The significance of this pluralistic composition is
that the American military career man is not so molded
that he is extracted from the multiplicity of society
itself. Indeed, the incidence of drug and alcohol abuse
during the Vietnam War reflects just how pervasively the
problems of society at large permeated the membership of
the American Armed Forces. Nevertheless, this study
refrains from making generalizations from the prisoner-
of-war organization because the nature of the sample and
the degree of stress could surely taint the conclusions.
Moreover, such an endeavor is best left to the reader.
Instead, this study seeks in the end to compare the




Another implication of the stress involved in being
a prisoner of war is that it tears away the facade of
polite societal norms and exposes the individual to a
"do-or-die" situation. Several studies of organized
behavior in disaster support the value of such a study in
that people react differently under stress (Barton, 1969;
Dynes, 1970) . R. Clarkson, a leading photojournalism
recently explained his concentration on athletic events:
Shooting sports is an attempt to get behind the
scenes to see what happens when tension invades
people. Like politics, sports throw people into
an adverse situation. There's so much more than
the action and spectacle. (Tharp, 1976, p. 15)
In the same vein there is much more to the experi-
ence of being a prisoner of war than the smoke and the
pain; there is an incredible amount of tension between
two unattractive alternatives: to resist and organize,
or to obey the North Vietnamese. The fact that more
than several bodies of former prisoners of war were
returned to the United States by the North Vietnamese is
evidence alone that the costs of resistance could ulti-
mately be death. The point here is that the findings of
empirical research and theoretical concepts about organ-
izations can be most applicable and useful in understand-
ing the attitudes and behaviors of American prisoners of
war who lived constantly under threat of torture. With
such an insight, the circumstances of the prisoner-of-war
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organization may be seen in a larger organizational con-
text in which such conditions as torture may be viewed
as another form of stress, similar to the fear of failure
in executives or the fear of being dismissed among labor
forces. No matter what the stress, organizations seek
means to alleviate and accommodate tensions in order to
maintain some equilibrium. The prisoner-of-war organiza-
tion in North Vietnam was no exception, and that is what
this discourse is all about.

Chapter 4
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM AND FUNCTIONS
The essence of every organization is its social
system which Caplow (1964) defines as "a set of persons
with an identifying characteristic plus a set of rela-
tionships established among these persons by interaction"
(p. 1) . Thus, people alone are like fence posts and
when they become part of a social system, the series of
interactions serve as the rails of the fence. It is the
joining of the posts and rails that gives the fence its
boundary, structure, and ultimately clues to its func-
tions. Hence, it is appropriate to begin a study of
organization with a description of the social system.
This chapter describes in detail three prisons in North
Vietnam, analyzes the structure of these prisons, and
builds an interpretation of the functions of the pris-
oner-of-war organization in these prisons.
Little Vegas: 1969-1970
By 1969 the organization of prisoners in Little
Vegas was very developed. Located in the northeast
corner of the central prison (Hoa Lo) of Hanoi, Little
Vegas consisted of the highest ranking officers, several
junior hard-core officers who had either escaped or been
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caught in providing resistance leadership, and four men
who had been captured in Laos. Most of these men lived
in pairs, but some individuals remained in solitary con-
finement. With the exception of two prisoners, every
member had nearly two years or more of prison life, and
many had over four years of prison experience. Hence,
by the start of 1970, the membership of this prison was
a well seasoned group, highly proficient in tap code,
and very creative in designing new communication methods
such as hand codes and vocal codes. In short, the prison
was extremely well organized with every man at least
knowing the other prisoners and their location in the
camp. Moreover, some of the men had a background on
others and thus carried firm sentiments (some positive
and some negative) about other members.
The camp was divided into three large subunits:
Thunderbird, Desert Inn, and Stardust. The former formed
the northern boundary of the prison while the latter two
comprised the eastern wing. Three other small subunits
existed and were named Golden Nugget, the Mint, and
Riviera. The latter was used for guardrooms, interroga-
tions, and occasionally punishment cells, figure 3 gives
a detailed presentation of the layout of this prison.
Within each subunit, communication was conducted by tap












































Map of Little Vegas
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These times were chosen because most of the guards ate
then and few were left to monitor the passageways in the
cellblocks. Lookout was accomplished by peeking under
the cell doors at each end of a passageway (McGrath,
1975, p. 33). When a guard approached, the lookout would
thump the wall in such a manner that ears on the wall
could hear but the approaching guard could not. In most
of the subunits, the pattern of communication was similar
to a "Y" pattern (Leavitt, 1958).
Communication between subunits was more difficult
and infrequent than the intracellblock communication.
Note drops were established in the latrine areas where
feces buckets were dumped and cleaned at the start of
each day. Because of the fetid odor and unpleasant slime
in these latrines, the guards had the habit of standing
back from the dimly lit proceedings of bucket-cleaning
and rarely inspected the area. Another common place to
exchange notes and verbal information was in the wash
stalls where men from the Thunderbird and Golden Nugget
used the west side and men from the Mint, Desert Inn,
and Stardust used the east side. Finally, when prisoners
were allowed to use the Ping-Pong table between the Star-
dust and Desert Inn in the spring of 1970 and a Viet-
namese version of billiards in the Riviera, note drops
were made in the tables, holes in the walls, and other
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cracks and crannies. In this way, each subunit could
gather information and report to the subunit with the
SRO, and in turn the SRO could issue policy orders to
each subunit which would disseminate the orders within
its cellblock.
In early 1970, the pattern of communication in
Little Vegas was an all-channel network (Guetzkow &
Simon, 1955) . A number of individuals wrote notes to
several prisoners in separate cells within the same cell-
block. Thus, there arose a prolific correspondence with
notes even in rafters of the wash stalls. The abundance
of notes led to detection and resulted in personal
searches when prisoners went to and from the wash areas.
Moreover, the discovery of a note in code during May of
1970, when the Vietnamese were already suspicious of
intracamp organization, forced the Vietnamese to take
more action in preventing communication (Dramesi, 1975,
p. 179) . Thus, a system was developed in which one man
within each subunit would write the notes to other cell-
blocks. Moreover, some efforts were made to keep all
notes flowing to and from the subunit with the SRO. For
example, if the SRO was located in the Thunderbird, the
Stardust sent and received notes only from the Thunder-
bird. If the Stardust wanted to pass a note to the
Golden Nugget, the men in the Thunderbird could act as a
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relay, but this type of communication was discouraged.
Such an intracamp pattern closely resembled the wheel
pattern (Leavitt, 1958)
.
The nature of the information passed at Little Vegas
can be divided into four general categories: communica-
tion procedures, resistance policy, current events, and
entertainment such as jokes or short stories. Since the
system was well developed, little time was spent on set-
ting up additional communication procedures. However, a
few plans were promulgated in case of an emergency or
contingent upon some unusual torture. For example, if a
guard began some type of punishment on his own, the
prisoner was to yell "Bao, Bao Cao!" The normal method
for requesting attention was to report "Bao Cao" to the
guard who was supposed to summon an officer or inter-
preter. This signal was modified by the additional "Bao"
and when heard, this cry of "Bao, Bao Cao !" was to be
continued by every prisoner at full volume. In this way
the attention of the Vietnamese administration could
have been quickly focused on unauthorized behavior by
guards. Conditions by 197 were such that this procedure
was never used at Little Vegas, but the knowledge of this
ability for a unified stand in the face of some emergency
was a comfort to many prisoners.
The content of resistance policy and orders in 1970
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was varied and in some areas difficult to implement. The
North Vietnamese were intent on using the prisoner of
war as a political tool. Some prisoners were tortured
into making tape-recorded letters to their friends in an
effort to encourage Americans in the field of battle to
refuse to fight. Others were forced to make "war crime"
confessions. Still others were coerced into memorizing
answers to be repeated before delegations of American war
protesters visiting North Vietnam. Lieutenant Commander
D. W. Hoffman, in testimony before the House Committee on
Internal Security on May 9, 1973, revealed how he was
forced to meet Jane Fonda and how the North Vietnamese
skillfully used his injuries to apply the needed pain
for his motivation to do and say what he did not really
believe (U.S. Congress, House Committee on Internal
Security, Hearings
, pp. 6-7, 18-19). In 1970, the
standing SRO policy at Little Vegas was to avoid aiding
the North Vietnamese propaganda effort but to protect
yourself from serious injury. The senior officers
intended to provide by their example and encouragement
the incentive to survive in adverse conditions without
compromising the war effort. A common interpretation of
SRO intentions regarding resistance was: "Say no, but
say it with a smile and don't let them break your bones."
In the spring of 1970, the North Vietnamese forced
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prisoners to make tape recordings espousing the Communist
view of the news. This version was then broadcast to all
prisoners in their cells. The POW communication system
was then employed to spread orders--first to those men
who were not making tapes directing them to refuse tape
recording if the North Vietnamese asked them to join this
effort; and secondly, to make obvious mistakes and mis-
pronunciations to those prisoners who had been forced to
make tape recordings. Soon the broadcasts were filled
with references to Senators "Halfbright" and "May Govern"
which provided many prisoners with some comic relief.
The pace of the resistance, however, quickened. The SRO
ordered all prisoners to stop any tape recording, writ-
ing, and any other activities which could be utilized for
propaganda. In addition, procedures were established
for a unified hunger strike to protest the remaining
solitary prisoners with no cellmates. Selected senior
officers were to make this point for group living, while
the majority of the men was to give the excuse that they
did not feel well or were not hungry. In May of 1970,
just when Dramesi had been caught with a coded note, the
hunger strike was implemented. The result of the strike
left more men in solitary confinement than before the
strike and created an intense anticommunication drive by
the North Vietnamese. Nevertheless, in June and July,
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the routine of the prison was changed, and one cell was
permitted to wash, exercise, and visit with the men from
another cell. Thus, the dyad relationships of each cell
in 1970 slowly began to expand to four and six-member
groups.
Since little news had reached the prisoners of
Little Vegas since 1968, the author's arrival in late
1969 was the source of much information on the lunar
landing, sports, impact of the Miranda decision, elec-
tions of 1968, and other not-so-current events. In
fact, in early 1970 there was such a need to share this
information that communication gave the author a sense
of purpose. The author and his cellmate spent long hours
at night writing notes on toilet paper to be passed the
next day and read as a newspaper named the "Vegas
Gambler" (Rowen, 1973, pp. 91-92). Yet, as larger groups
of prisoners were allowed to visit each other, fewer
stories of current events and entertainment were passed
from subunit to subunit. The issues of active versus
passive resistance and reports from interrogations were
emphasized. Meanwhile, within the enlarging cells enter-
tainment conversations such as the recounting in detail
of films or novels flourished. This trend toward inter-
group communication focusing on resistance policy and
intragroup communication emphasizing entertainment

51
continued in Camp Unity into 1971.
Although the North Vietnamese were constantly devis-
ing new ways to prevent prisoner communication, their own
efforts often facilitated the prisoners' communication
system. For instance, every six to nine months the North
Vietnamese would reshuffle all the prisoners. Hence,
news was transferred between prisons. Moreover, within
each prison there were sporadic and frequent moves which
furthered the dispersal of information and did not
seriously disrupt communication. After the first meal
in a new cell, a prisoner would listen very carefully
for a series of coughs and throat noises which would
signal all clear to communicate. Then, upon first con-
tact, the new prisoner would identify himself, establish
his voice call-up signal, and thus become a part of the
subunit.
The most noted example of how the North Vietnamese
unwittingly aided prisoner communication occurred in
Little Vegas in March of 1970. Several times, prisoners
had been caught talking through the drains in the wash
area. From the increase of refusals to participate in
prison activities, the North Vietnamese suspected resist-
ance orders were being passed and they took measures to
stop all communication in the bath stalls. The solid
doors were horizontally cut in half; when the prisoners
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were washing, the top part of the door remained open. A
guard was stationed in the passageway in front of the
stalls so that he could hear and see the proceedings.
However, the guard usually sat on a stool and only
listened for talking. Meanwhile, those prisoners in the
Golden Nugget could watch every move in the wash stalls
and could transmit to observant prisoners in the wash
stalls by passing a hand by a hole in the bottom of the
door. In turn, the washing prisoner could transfer much
information by use of a hand code which McGrath (1975,
p. 49) has illustrated. A very robust activity sprung
up; and when prisoners from the Stardust began to wash
on the west side of the bath stalls, messages could be
circulated to the entire camp from the Golden Nugget. In
this way, changes by the North Vietnamese aided communi-
cation integration and also increased the speed by which
information could be passed from one end of the prison
to the other. Men in the Golden Nugget at this time
were in a position similar to the central person in the
wheel pattern in Leavitt's experimental work (1958).
Camp Unity: 1971
Christmas of 197 brought a new condition to the
men of Little Vegas. Over forty of its members were
moved to the central part of the prison (Hoa Lo) and




Prisons in other parts of Hanoi were consolidated in a
similar fashion. McGrath (1975) and many other prisoners
felt the raid on Son Tay was the cause of this centrali-
zation of prisoners. However, one exception to group
living was the isolated northwest corner of Hoa Lo where
four colonels, four Americans captured in Laos, and
three prisoners from Thailand were located. These men
were separated into pairs and shared a cell seven feet
long and ten feet wide. Metal stocks were a permanent
part of each concrete slab which served as a bed. The
four Americans captured in Laos were allowed to wash
together and exercise in the small enclosed courtyard
outside the entrance to their cellblock (see Figure 4 ) .
During one of these exercise periods, the one guard was
distracted in the courtyard by two prisoners while E.
Brace talked to the colonels and the author maintained
lookout for Brace. In this way, the highest ranking
prisoners of war in Hanoi were first contacted at Camp
Unity.
During other exercise periods, Brace found that a
board on the east wall opened to a large cell of Ameri-
cans which later was numbered Cell #1. Brace was able to
set up communication procedures after lunch and dinner
when the dishes were to be washed for the cellblock. In






























and over the wall. In the other direction, voice commu-
nication through the rear windows was quickly established
since we could hear the 19 men calling "Good night" to
each other at the quiet time before sleep. This group,
known later as #00, had come from the prison known as
the Zoo and contained E. Alvarez, the first American to
be captured in North Vietnam. Their membership was rela-
tively young and contained some enlisted men; they were
attempting to hold their own group Sunday services.
The dialogue which began with the colonels reveals
the increasing significance of communications on resist-
ance. Since the colonels were closely watched and
threatened with harsh punishment if they were ever caught
communicating, the great bulk of communication effort
fell on the four Americans captured in Laos, who became
known as LULU, the Legendary Union of Laotian Unfortu-
nates. In fact, this LULU group became the colonels 1
only communications link with the prison. The North
Vietnamese were extremely conscious of military rank,
and experiences at Little Vegas confirmed that punishment
for higher ranking officers was always more severe than
punishment for junior officers. In this setting, the
military adage "RHIP" ("Rank Has Its Privileges") could
also stand for "Rank Has Its Pain"; and these colonels
wanted to use every resource within their means to
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implement resistance without being detected.
The content of intercell communication stressed
various issues of resistance. Questions from Cell #00
centered at first on the issue of a possible early
release. Nine American prisoners of war had already-
been released by the North Vietnamese, but the deliber-
ately misleading impressions from these releases made
the North Vietnamese appear to be following at least the
general spirit of the Geneva Convention's guidelines for
treatment of prisoners of war. Some prisoners viewed
these releases as a form of parole which the Code of
Conduct explicitly forbid. In any case, such releases
were seen by most prisoners as a pardon, or at least as
a "special favor" (McCain, 1973, p. 50) . Because E.
Alvarez had already been a prisoner for almost seven
years at this time, his companions wanted some SRO policy
which would condone, support, or in any way morally
justify an early release for him. At least one dozen
questions concerning aspects of this issue were directed
toward the SRO, but the ultimate result remained the
same as before: the order of "No early or special
release" was again issued.
In contrast to Cell #00, information from Cell #1
and other cells in that direction concerned resistance.
The men in these cells appeared to be divided into two
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poles of thought concerning the organizational goals of
prisoners of war. At one extreme, there was a handful of
"hard-core" resisters who went out of their way to resist
and cause the North Vietnamese problems. Suggestions for
psychological warfare teams to harass guards and make
plans for massive escape attempts (Dramesi/ 1975) were
proposed. Ultimately these men wanted to command respect
from the North Vietnamese and force them into adherence
to the 1948 Geneva Convention's rules for treatment of
prisoners of war. On the other side, there were many
who wanted to survive in order to eventually go home
again. They did not want to make propaganda for the
enemy but reasoned that such writing and tape recording
were of little practical use. Moreover, they perceived
the costs of refusal (beatings with rubber hoses, strap
and bar torture, and/or isolation in leg irons) to be
too high. Essentially, these men saw the guidelines of
the Geneva Convention as an unreachable yet attractive
ideal; in the end, they wanted just to be left alone to
enjoy the opportunity of group living which had so
recently been gained.
The issues of resistance were so complex that the
colonels could not formulate a policy which could be
easily transmitted through the present communication
chain. Even a lengthy note passed from one cell to
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another would have left many contingencies uncovered.
Thus, the SRO supported each cellblock commander and
officially endorsed the organization already adopted by
the cell which formerly occupied Little Vegas. These
men had employed the Air Force flight system wherein
four men served as a flight, one of whom was the leader.
The flight leaders in turn were responsible to the most
senior man in the cell who had a small staff to support
him (Dramesi, 1975, p. 192). In addition to supporting
this type of military table of organization, the SRO
gave "authority and responsibility" to each cell's com-
mander to make decisions as he saw fit. In this way,
the SRO was trying to create enough autonomy so that if
or when intercell communication was interrupted, general
organization and resistance would continue.
The pattern of the communication in this prison was
at first a chain (Leavitt, 1958). Cell #2 could communi-
cate with only its neighbors, Cells #1 and #3. Later,
the communications team in each cell attempted to create
a common note drop so that the pattern could resemble an
all-channel network (Guetzkow & Simon, 1955) . A signif-
icant aspect of these patterns was the specialization
within each cell; each flight had its own area of
endeavor. Hence, the few men concerned with communica-
tions reported to the cell commander who in turn would
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pass the word to the flight leaders. Such a hierarchy
put heavy emphasis on the higher ranking officers.
On February 10, 1971, a disturbance erupted over the
question of religious services in Cell #7. When the
North Vietnamese removed several leaders from Cell #7, a
shout and chorus of "God Bless America" broke the quiet
of the prison. Later that evening, this chorus of "God
Bless America" erupted again and unified the entire camp
in song. Then a more blatant display of organization was
demonstrated by a round robin chant. Cell #7 began with
"This is seven! This is seven! Where in hell is number
six?" The chant was passed all the way around the prison
where it ended with Cell #000, not #0 as erroneously
reported by Dramesi (1975, p. 210) . This last cell was
particularly significant because it contained most of
the prisoners who were still making tape recordings and
writing propaganda for the North Vietnamese.
The North Vietnamese response to this riot was
immediate and effective. First, the sound system was
activated at full volume with Vietnamese music. In the
middle of the night, the four Americans captured in Laos
(LULU) were removed from Hanoi to solitary, rat-infested
cells in an Army camp west of the city. The next morning
the senior men in each cell were isolated, interrogated,
and punished. A prolonged communications purge had
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begun (Dramesi, 1975, p. 211).
Plantation: 1971-1972
Adapted to use as a prison, the Plantation up to
1969 was the staging area for North Vietnamese releases
of prisoners of war. The camp was divided into three
main units— the Gunshed to the south, the Warehouse to
the west, and the Corncrib to the north. Figure 5
depicts the detailed layout of this prison. In 1971, the
North Vietnamese moved Americans captured in South Viet-
nam, mostly during the Hue Offensive in 1968, to the
Plantation. The four Americans captured in Laos plus a
new member captured in February of 1971 were moved to
the Plantation in July of 1971. This LULU group was
separated into pairs and isolated in the Gunshed where
they contacted Lieutenant Colonel Guy by tapping on
walls. Colonel Guy reported that the camp was composed
mostly of enlisted men who were "afraid" to communicate,
and thus there was very low morale here. Shortly after-
ward, Brace and the author when washing were able to
talk to some prisoners in the north end. According to
these men, the camp was divided in half, with good com-
munications at the north end of the Warehouse and the
Corncrib, but no communication from the south end of
camp. They warned us about one group whom they labeled
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reported to the Communists any prisoner communications
which they had observed. One member of this group had
reportedly singled out a sergeant whom he had served
with before incarceration and called him a "war criminal."
The sergeant had subsequently been punished for over a
year by solitary confinement in stocks and occasional
beatings.
LULU's past experience was immediately put to use
to establish note drops, connect the camp, and unify it
under the command of the SRO. However, the North Viet-
namese went to a great deal of work to prevent such
organization. The prisoners in the Gunshed were soon
prohibited from washing at the north end of camp. A new
wash area was built with tar paper and bamboo at the
south end by the pigpens. Nevertheless, all the buckets
were dumped in the latrine at the south end since it was
the only latrine in the camp. Note drops were estab-
lished in this area and the adjacent wash shed.
The most difficult contact in establishing campwide
communication was in reaching members of the south end
of the Warehouse without the antiwar group's discovering
the interaction. The ancient Christian sign of the fish
was drawn on a brick in the wash area with a piece of
limestone. The next day a smiling face appeared on the
fish. So, a general note, not identifying the author,
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was written and placed under the brick the following day.
Instructions for future notes were given, especially the
need to wrap notes in plastic and bury them in the mud
beneath the brick. The following day the note was gone
and two days later, per instructions, we found a detailed
note wrapped in plastic and buried in the mud. Such was
the "technology" employed to construct what was perhaps
the safest mailbox in North Vietnam. Later, searches
and communication purges uncovered many communication
methods and notedrops, but this particular mailbox
remained undetected until it was destroyed when the wash
shed was dismantled.
In only a few months, the Plantation was organized
under Lieutenant Colonel Guy's authority as SRO. The
enlisted troops enjoyed his code name, Hawk, and at times
expended much effort in surreptitiously saluting his
room. Occasionally several privates shouted encourage-
ment to others so that the men in the Gunshed knew they
were all getting the welcomed word to resist. The North
Vietnamese also felt the increasing resistance as more
and more prisoners became sullen in interrogations and
refused to make any tape recordings.
Then, during some Christmas festivities when one
room played a staged basketball game with the antiwar
group, a naive gesture was made to a member of the
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antiwar group to join the prisoners* organization. The
exchange of notes in feces buckets and in the latrine was
explained to prove that the prisoners really were organ-
ized and wanted this "wayward" group to regain a resist-
ance posture. The one problem with this gesture was
that no one else knew about it until the next day. Early
in the morning, after Colonel Guy had delivered a note,
a force of guards with face masks emerged from the Big
House. The bucket-dumping brigade from the north end
was intercepted and searched on the spot. Meanwhile,
two guards went to the latrine and returned in about one
minute with Colonel Guy's note. In this way, the commu-
nication purge of 1972 began and resulted in torture and
isolation for the SRO.
Although the above incident was the most serious
compromise witnessed of any communication system, commu-
nication continued in the note drop under the brick.
Moreover, a new method of placing notes in loaves of
bread was discovered, and this resulted in a backup
method of communicating from the south Warehouse to the
Gunshed. When Colonel Guy was returned to his old cell
in the Gunshed, his pain, broken teeth, and battered legs
were clearly evident. Yet, he did not order all commu-
nication to stop. Instead, he ordered us to continue
and to disregard the tape recording the North Vietnamese
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had forced him to make. This tape recording was played
to the senior man of each cell and basically said that
the only "authority" in this prison lay in the North
Vietnamese camp commander; all prisoners were to obey
the "camp regulations" and the "camp commander." At the
same time, tar paper screens were erected in the large
courtyard so that visibility from and to the Gunshed was
eliminated. The year 1972 saw reduced intergroup commu-
nication, but communication was never completely stopped
and its content continued to focus on resistance policy.
By 1972, most of the prisoners knew the name of every
man in the Plantation and were aware of the SRO's policy
concerning resistance efforts.
The most demoralizing aspect of 1972 was to see the
rewards given to the antiwar group. Beer and powdered
milk were given to this group once a week but not to
other prisoners. On weekdays the antiwar group was per-
mitted to exercise outdoors for most of the day. After
the communication purge, no spontaneous overtures to
include this antiwar group in the prison organization
were made, but several prisoners joined their group and
their antiwar activities. With each new addition to the
antiwar group, it was necessary to establish a new mail-
box in the latrine; and the system functioned without
interruption. The significance here is that communica-
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tion in and of itself was a necessity, not just for
military resistance which was definitely enhanced by
organization and SRO leadership, but also for human
existence. Man is a social animal, and no matter what
costs are imposed on building a social system, man will
build.
The Functions of Communication
As indicated above, the primary function which the
communication system served was to build an interaction
network between individuals and groups. "It was essen-
tial for everyone to know what was happening in camp,
whether the news was about a new torture or just a
friendly word of encouragement to a fellow POW" (McGrath,
1975, p. 34). Coker contends that "communications kept
us together in spirit and determination and allowed us
to get home alive, in good shape, with our mentalities
intact" (1974, p. 42). In short, interaction through
communication served to reinforce each prisoner's belief
in his own human worth, a belief which the North Viet-
namese tried to undermine in many ways (such as forcing
the prisoners to bow from the waist) . Keve (1974)
describes this quality of communication as follows:
It is a qualitative condition that is composed
only partly of the exchange of information, and
more importantly is a sharing of presence, and
mood, and feeling. It is a thing of gestures,
glances, caresses, and even shared silences.
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It is this poignant togetherness and nonverbal
touching of the spirits that constitute the
real quality and need of communication, whether
or not any substantive information is exchanged,
(p. 34)
Such a definition of communication comes closest to des-
cribing the primary function and need of a communication
system in a prison. But what explains the great length
to which prisoners would go to build communications and
help other prisoners?
Aronson (1972) suggests two variables which might
explain why individuals come to the aid of strangers in
distress: the feeling of mutuality or "common fate" and
the absence of escape from the immediate situation (p.
42) . Both of these variables applied to conditions at
Little Vegas and explain the cohesiveness and willingness
of prisoners to help one another. Yet the most signif-
icant of these two variables was the feeling of sharing
a common misfortune. There was a definite sense of
community remarkably close to Tonnies' concept of
Gemeinschaft as developed by Nisbet (1966, pp. 74-82).
Being a prisoner of war was not an association in Viet-
nam; rather it was the forced union of hearts, minds,
and bodies into one family of misfortune.
On a personal basis, communication provided a
prisoner the resources to overcome periods of depression
and doubt. Coker (1974) reports that after a torture
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session, it was common to sink into self-pity and
remorse. The man in the next cell then would devote his
total day's effort to lifting up his fallen comrade.
Such an effort was really an exchange in that the helping
prisoner not only gained a sense of purpose in the other-
wise squalid boredom of a nothing routine, but also
established a mutual debt on the other prisoner to return
the help if the encourager were to experience depression
or torture in the future. Thus, the psychological
impact of this communication was a two-way process or an
exchange. The depressed prisoner gained encouragement
and belief in his own human worth. The helping prisoner
achieved a sense of purpose, a meaning in life, and
built a potential reservoir of help for a future time
when he would need encouragement. In this way, the
communication system provided the strength of a confirma-
tion group as outlined in Schein (1969, p. 100)
.
A secondary function of communication was to estab-
lish a united resistance posture. The exchange of infor-
mation often gave prisoners a means for anticipating
questions in an upcoming interrogation. For example, in
1970 the North Vietnamese began a program to get each
prisoner to write about Mother's Day in order to test
the resolution of the prisoner organization. The SRO's
order was explicit: "Write nothing for the North
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Vietnamese." When interrogators could not obtain written
material, some individuals were threatened with torture
but did not write and were not tortured. The word that
these men succeeded gave strength to those who were
later threatened with isolation and punishment. In this
way, the exchange of information allowed the less suc-
cessful resisters to achieve higher levels of resistance.
In the words of Coker (1974) , "Communication allowed the
weaker PW's to draw strength and guidance from the
stronger" (p. 43)
.
The exchange of information also helped resistance
in that it provided alternative methods. Some prisoners
found it always best to say "No" to North Vietnamese
requests. Others were successful by using some decep-
tion. Still other prisoners played the role of incompe-
tents and made such a mess with the ink or tape machine
that the North Vietnamese were only too happy to send
the spastic prisoner back to his cell. In the summer of
1970, the author and his cellmate, E. Brace, were
assigned the job of moving some long bamboo poles. There
were many screens erected behind which other prisoners
were walking and exercising. Brace and the author were
to place the poles along one such screen. The author,
being of slender build and weighing at that time about
125 pounds, immediately began an act of grunting and
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groaning when lifting. Prisoners nearby heard and
chuckled over the guard's futile efforts to keep him
quiet. Then with one pole in the air like a flagpole,
the author began to sway and teeter under the pretended
weight. Even the guard began to laugh, but when the
pole crashed against several screens and flattened them,
the prisoners stood face to face and exchanged greetings.
The guard went berserk, and all the prisoners started
pointing at the "heavy" pole. When the Vietnamese
officer tried to untangle the incident, he concluded
that the author and his cellmate were just not competent
enough to perform the simplest of tasks. Here was a
place that the apparent lack of talent could be a great
asset; the exchange of such information was valuable
knowledge.
The emphasis of communication was placed first on
the primary function of providing human interaction.
Isolated and alone, a prisoner could reach to his neigh-
bor to gain confidence and reassurance. As individuals
were placed into larger groups, the content of inter-
group communication shifted increasingly from personal
support to the issues surrounding resistance. As pre-
viously noted, Dramesi (1975) stressed the question of
escape. On the other hand, Coker (1974) raised the
perplexing problem of how the North Vietnamese tried to
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weaken the prisoners' resistance by placing poor resist-
ers in charge of junior men who had resisted well in the
past. The isolation of senior resisters placed even
more stress on the emphasis given to resistance policy.
The significant point of this shift in emphasis of
organizational communication is that changes in structure
shifted the function of communication between subunits
.
Such a finding is contrary to studies concerning union
leadership structure in which a one-way relationship was
presented as "functions determine the structure" (Tannen-
baum, 1968, p. 31). In the prisoner-of-war organization,
changes in structure by the North Vietnamese shifted the
focus of organizational goals and thus resulted in grow-
ing emphasis on resistance policy.
In short, changes in structure of the prisoner-of-
war organization caused changes in the organization's
functions. In the studies of union leadership, labor
always could control its structure. But in the prisoner-
of-war situation, structure was often decided by the
North Vietnamese, and the organization of prisoners had
to work around structural conditions. As more and more
prisoners were permitted to live in one cell together,
intercell communication shifted from personal support
and entertainment to issues of how to best resist the
North Vietnamese. Thus, in this case, structure did
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determine functions of the organization. What were the
key variables which influenced and at times controlled
resistance policy and prisoners' behavior? The next two
chapters attempt to identify and analyze the most signif-
icant variables on the behavior and attitudes of prison-
ers of war within their covert organization.

Chapter 5
THE ROLE OF AUTHORITY
Authority per se is a diverse and fascinating area
to study. It can be approached in many ways, as shown
in Chapter 2. The author's experiences in Hanoi led him
to clearly distinguish between the man and the authority
of his rank. Although there are several methods which
could be used to explore this difference (French & Raven,
1969; Homans, 1950; and Peabody, 1964), the concept of
role theory seems most useful since it often is so easy
to separate an actor from the role he or she is playing.
Katz and Kahn (1966) lend support to this emphasis by
their contention that the concept of role is "the build-
ing block of social systems and the summation of the
requirements with which the system confronts the individ-
ual" (p. 171). Katz and Kahn (1966, p. 187) present an
elaborate model of role theory in which organizational
factors, personality, and interpersonal skills are
viewed as inputs to a role sender. The role sender
takes his role expectations and sends role behaviors to
focal persons who in turn receive the role and display
an end behavior. This process they define as a "role
episode" (p. 182) . This chapter seeks to show how the

74
command structure of the prisoner-of-war organization in
Hanoi can be described and analyzed in terms of the Katz
and Kahn model (1966, p. 187). From this description,
an interpretation of the level of control within the
organization will be made. Incidents of role conflict
will be explored from cognitive dissonance theory and
from the concept of uncertainty in an effort not only to
understand deviance from the organizational norms, but
also to gain insight into the range of obedience.
Role Expectations
Before the United States was even formed, a tradi-
tional expectation or ideal of prisoner-of-war behavior
was established by the example of Nathan Hale. Caught
by the British, this Revolutionary War officer was hung
as a spy and according to legend, he gave no information
to the British except his well-known last words of "I
regret that I have but one life to give for my country"
(Coker, 1974, p. 44) . Throughout the history of the
United States, custom grew that prisoners of war were to
resist and escape if possible. No formal code or process
of formal training for prisoners of war existed [The
Armed Forces Officer, 1960, p. 24). Instead, the social
order was a product of ongoing human activity which
included not only the actions of prisoners of war but
also the legends, mythology, and gossip surrounding
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those actions. Berger and Luckmann (1967) best describe
such a social construction:
Social order exists only as a product of human
activity. No other ontological status may be
ascribed to it without hopelessly obfuscating
its empirical manifestations. Both in its
genesis (social order is the result of past
human activity) and its existence in any instant
of time (social order exists only and insofar as
human activity continues to produce it) , it is a
human product. (p. 52)
The experiences of prisoners of war in the Korean
War proved that human activity no longer could informally
produce the expected behavior without some type of
internal organization. The Code of Conduct, a formal
statement of expected behavior for American prisoners of
war, was written and promulgated as Executive Order
#10631 in 1955 (see appendix) . One significant aspect
of this development was that instead of being a legal
standard such as the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
the Code of Conduct stood as a moral code. It was the
prescribed behavior for all American fighting men who
were captured.
In essence, the Code of Conduct states that an
American fighting man will not quit and if captured, he
will hold his honor high by keeping faith in his God and
country. If captured, he will not make any statements
which could harm his country, its allies, or his fellow
prisoners of war. Instead, he will resist, attempt
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escape, and keep faith with his fellow prisoners of war.
Most significant of all, if senior in rank he will take
command; and if not, he will obey the "lawful orders" of
those in command. Hence, this moral code in clear and
concise terms provided a legitimatization of the author-
ity of rank into the prisoner-of-war situation. Although
the genesis of military authority in the prisoner-of-war
camp lies now in the Code of Conduct, its continued
existence lies in the effort and work of human produc-
tion. According to Berger and Luckmann (1967), the
reality could not exist on the expectation alone, but
required ongoing human activity. Such activity falls
into the process of role sending.
The Role Sent
In 1955, the signing of the Executive Order on the
Code of Conduct had to be given the widest dissemination
as possible. A program was set up to display the six
articles of the Code of Conduct on six separate posters
which carried an illustration depicting an appropriate
action with the words of the article in clear and large
print across the face of the picture. These pictures
were (and still are) displayed in mess hall entrances,
hallways, and other highly trafficked areas. They serve
as a visual affirmation of a value for the expected
behavior if captured. In addition to this dissemination,
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the armed forces carefully examined their socialization
processes and added the Code of Conduct to their training
efforts.
The abundance of scholarly articles and works deal-
ing with socialization processes is too rich to review
in this study. Caplow (1964) seems to have clearly
defined the concept in organizational terms as follows:
The organizationally directed process that pre-
pares and qualifies individuals to occupy organiza-
tional positions is called socialization . It may
be visualized as continuous since the behaviors
appropriate to an organizational position are not
acquired once and for all when the position is
assumed, but are learned and relearned throughout
the length of a career. (p. 169)
The significance of this definition is that socialization
is an ongoing process and does not simply end at the
conclusion of some training or indoctrination course.
Caplow (1964, pp. 172-178) identifies ten modes of
socialization such as training, schooling, and anticipa-
tory socialization. In regard to the Code of Conduct,
the military placed heavy emphasis on the learning of
principles in recruit and officer candidate training.
Moreover, specific schools were created to give soldiers
and airmen facing the highest risk of becoming captured
a chance to experience simulated conditions of captivity;
mortification was a mode used in this phase. The purpose
of this intensive training was to seriously challenge
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each individual's values so that he would be better
equipped to face a more serious attack in a prisoner-of-
war situation. As Aronson (1972) suggests, "the person
who is easiest to 'brainwash' is the person whose ideas
about Americanism are based on slogans that have never
been seriously challenged" (p. 83) . After initial train-
ing and schooling, the Code of Conduct was periodically
reviewed and discussed at meetings in each operating
unit. All these efforts were clearly aimed at instilling
the values of the Code of Conduct in each American
fighting man. However, if one remembers Caplow's (1964)
definition of socialization, one can see that this proc-
ess would continue in the actual prisoner-of-war setting
by the ongoing production of internal organization. In
short, once the role is sent, it cries out for continual
reinforcement and reception within the focal person.
Role Reception
Notwithstanding the expectations and socialization
surrounding the prisoner-of-war role, one never fully
anticipates or plans on being captured. The wide major-
ity of men encountered never paid close attention to the
probabilities of becoming a prisoner of war but assumed
the chances to be so low as to be truly irrelevant.
Hence, the reality of being captured never clearly
emerged until the experience was actually occurring.

79
Only at the time of capture was the role of authority in
a prisoner-of-war situation finally received. The
dilemma each prisoner of war faced in the Vietnam War
was that the North Vietnamese had access to a great deal
of intelligence and knew from newspapers and other public
sources a lot about American military affairs. The
interrogators would not settle for name, rank, serial
number, and date of birth. If a prisoner behaved to the
letter of the Code of Conduct, he stood a good chance of
a slow and futile death. On the other hand, if a
prisoner gave some information, where would he stop
providing information? Moreover, if one fails to obey
one article, has he not failed to live up to all the
articles? Simply and personally stated, the question was
"Would I not be forever condemmed as a dishonorable man
or worse yet a traitor if I did not fully obey the Code
of Conduct?"
The torment of the above dilemma is usually too
much for one man to bear. He needs confirmation (Schein,
1969) ; he needs his fellow prisoners to help him recon-
struct some social order to the tangled maze of his
fears. Therefore, the concept of an SRO with a command
structure became a means for refinding an acceptable
self- justification, a social order in which an individual
alone in a sea of uncertainty could attach himself to
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something firm. The higher the uncertainty, the greater
was the need for an authority and command structure.
Taking command in a prisoner-of-war camp is a diffi-
cult task. When discovered, an SRO would be subjugated
to torture and forced to make demeaning statements on
tape recordings. As in the case of Lieutenant Colonel
Guy, described in the previous chapter, the isolation
and torture of an SRO did not eliminate the command
structure. Instead, the role of authority was simply
passed to the next senior officer. The sheer virtue of
seniority of rank determined who could take responsibil-
ity, decide policy, and issue resistance orders. Occa-
sionally a senior officer refused to accept his role of
authority, and this refusal caused problems (Coker, 1974,
p. 44) . However, on the several occasions when senior
men did not assume command, those next in line immediate-
ly assumed the responsibility. For example, in 1970 the
full colonels were moved to the Mint in Little Vegas.
No communications were received from these senior offi-
cers so the acting SRO, then Navy Commander J. Denton,
continued in his role of leadership. The word was
passed through the prison that Commander Denton had full
"authority" of SRO since the colonels were not part of
the system.
When Lieutenant Colonel R. Risner was moved into
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Little Vegas, his first communication was "Who is acting
SRO and what is his date of rank?" When he learned that
he was senior to Commander Denton, he assumed command.
One of his first actions was to establish a quiet time
for meditation and prayer at the end of each day. He
would initiate a signal which in turn was passed from
cell to cell. When he learned his predecessor's policy
on steadfast refusal to see visiting antiwar delegations,
he supported and reissued this order even though in the
past he had been tortured into meeting one of these
delegations (Risner, 1973). The courage of Risner's
example after his ordeals was an inspiration to many
junior prisoners of war.
After several weeks under Risner's command, Lieuten-
ant Colonel V. Ligon, a resident of more than several
months in the Desert Inn, sent a message listing his
very senior date of rank to Risner. Although Risner had
been selected for full colonel, he was still technically
a lieutenant colonel with a more recent date of rank
than the emerging lieutenant colonel from the Desert Inn.
Colonel Risner at once relinquished his role of SRO to
the man who had previously failed to accept this role
and sent word throughout Little Vegas that Lt. Colonel
Ligon was now the SRO. Such was the working of author-
ity. When an individual stepped forward with a more
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senior date of rank, he automatically was recognized and
thus received his role of authority as SRO. The primary
ingredient was that the individual had to receive his
role no matter how he personally would have preferred to
ignore this risky and painful responsibility. Regardless
of how weak a senior officer's resistance may have been,
the date of rank was the ultimate criterion for an SRO's
authority (Dramesi, 1975, pp. 192-193).
Role Behavior
According to Weber (1947) , the legal authority of a
position rests on the rational claim of legitimacy. The
impersonality of office was destined to make bureaucracy
a scientifically calculated response to the complexity
of modern society and its problems. In the prisoner-of-
war organization of Hanoi, the passage of SRO from one
man to another was based on the legal grounds of military
rank and the moral force of the Code of Conduct. How-
ever, the resultant behavior of those in authority roles
was by no means impersonal. The SRO often was viewed as
exposing himself to great danger to personally help
another prisoner. Consequently the role of authority in
many cases elicited positive identification, instead of
mere compliance, and sometimes was the major factor in




What would account for this stronger response? The
answer lies in the mutual feeling or sense of community
which was reflected in communications. In normal condi-
tions, the hierarchy of an organization has vertical and
horizontal communication in its system. Katz and Kahn
(1966) report that the content of information passed up,
down, and laterally is different. As early as Sayles
(1964) and as recently as Mintzberg (1973) , the impor-
tance of lateral communication has been stressed as a
source of "emotional and social support to the individ-
ual" (Katz & Kahn, 1966, p. 244). At first the harsh
conditions of imprisonment imposed by the North Viet-
namese resulted in the SRO and other high ranking offi-
cers' participating in both vertical and lateral communi-
cation with subordinates. Instead of an impersonality of
office, senior officers were forced to share their prob-
lems and feelings with much lower ranking officers.
Prisoners were constantly exchanging encouragement to
one another as described in the previous chapter. The
result of such communication was that the senior ranking
officers were more than just "top brass"; in the eyes of
subordinates, people could distinguish between the person
and the role of authority he was expected to perform.
Hence, deep interpersonal relationships developed
between senior and junior prisoners that heightened
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personal commitment to those in authority. The sense of
community was an integral part of respect for authority.
At times respect for authority as defined above
became internalized by prisoners who had never been close
to the SRO. How can this increased level of control be
explained? From experiences at the Plantation in 1971
and 1972, the answer appears to lie in the overreaction
by the North Vietnamese in their use of torture. When
the SRO was discovered providing leadership (as with
Colonel Guy)
,
policies through the next senior officer
were continued not because of any external rewards or
threat of later punishment, but on account of the per-
sonal commitment made to the man (referent power) , his
lawful authority (legitimate power) , and the values of
the Code of Conduct internalized through these serious
and brutal attacks by the North Vietnamese. In the face
of such cruelty (McGrath, 1975, pp. 60-91), prisoners
were able to transform feelings of revenge into the more
"noble cause" of resistance which freed "the resources
and energies that are necessary to engage in active
opposition" (Blau, 1964, p. 251). In this way the role
of authority began as a legitimate position with moral
influence for unity. By attacking the legitimacy of
this social order, the North Vietnamese solidified the
unity of the prisoner-of-war organization. In the words
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of Peabody (1964) "in periods of crisis, formal authority
is magnified" (p. 137) . And the North Vietnamese were
resourceful at creating crises for American prisoners of
war (Risner, 1973)
.
Many prisoners of war in Hanoi wanted strong leader-
ship. Subordinates accepted a wide latitude of what the
position of authority could dictate. Commander D. Clower
expressed how his men looked to him for the strength he
sometimes wondered if he himself had:
But the men wanted leadership. They wanted a
hard core leadership. So although at times it
bothered me to tell a man to be tortured, I
found out later that that was the degree of
leadership they wanted. They would rather go
that line than go the other. They were willing
to take hardships. They were willing to take
less. (Rowen, 1973, p. 248)
Commander Clower and other SROs ordered hunger strikes at
different times, and ultimately the subordinate reaction
was usually favorable. Such a phenomenon is indeed hard
to understand at first glance. Why would a man severely
underweight and already subsisting on a poor diet gladly
obey an order to stop eating? The answer lies in the
role behavior they perceived of themselves and the role
they expected of those senior to themselves. The desire
for action, no matter how ineffectual or painful, sus-
tained the social order and continually reinforced the
role of authority through tempestuous times of confronta-
tion with the North Vietnamese.
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Coker (1974) sheds some light on the importance of
the senior man's exerting influence and control through
his authority:
It really did not make too much difference what
was being done as long as it was done together.
Although there may be a lot of talk, and a lot
of group consensus achieved, there still has to
be a senior who finally says, "We will do it
this way!" If the senior man hid in the wood-
work, leaving his juniors to make decisions, it
really upset the applecart because it forced
each man to act for himself. (p. 43)
The above concept of strength in unity is indeed old, but
the significant aspect is that subordinates looked toward
those with formal authority to make decisions, set
policy, and issue specific orders. The subordinates in
this way played an important part in not only influencing
but also defining and hence controlling the role of
authority. Such a finding is in keeping with Barnard
(1938) and Simon (1957) who saw this subordinate influ-
ence on the authority structure of any organization.
Moreover, Katz and Kahn (1966, p. 187) in their model
provide a way for the focal person to make inputs to the
role sender through interpersonal factors. In Hanoi, the
role expectations and socialization processes were part
of the forces which exhorted subordinates to demand a
strong role from those of senior rank. The resultant
behavior was an ongoing production with the role of
authority as a constant to which all could find, in some
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degree, a relationship. The question which remains is
"What behavior resulted when an individual or group
became adamantly opposed to an SRO order or policy?"
Role Conflict
By analyzing role conflict, one uncovers the crucial
variable which supported the role of authority of an SRO.
Dramesi (1975) presents the role conflict of how SRO
orders to refrain from escape attempts were in complete
contradiction to the Code of Conduct which clearly
states, "I will make every effort to escape and aid
others to escape" [The Armed Forces Officer , 1960, p.
25) . However, an important question a prisoner had to
ask himself before escaping was, "What will happen to
those prisoners who remain behind?"
Rowen (1973) reports that "there were two escapes
from prisons in Hanoi, but in both cases the POWs were
quickly recaptured" (p. 89) . This author believes there
were several more escape attempts than just these two.
The point is that after each escape, the North Vietnamese
reaction was quick and harsh. Coker (1974) describes
this reaction as "fantastic reprisals" (p. 45) and makes
an argument for SRO orders to take precedence over
general guidelines in the Code of Conduct. In contrast,
Dramesi (1975) contends "nobody had authority to change
it [the Code of Conduct]" (p. 195). To understand this
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issue fully, one must examine not only the benefits of
escape but also the internal costs.
McGrath (1975) succinctly describes the reprisals
after Dramesi 1 s escape in 1969 as follows:
Many men in camp were beaten with rubber hoses
and straps. One man very nearly died when he
received 100 strokes a day for 9 days. Another
man was tortured to complete insanity during
this period. He reportedly died. The man in
the cell next to me was tortured to death after
an unsuccessful escape attempt. I was beaten
because I asked an officer for medical atten-
tion for a roommate's infected ear. (p. 46)
Because of these costs, senior officers regarded the
issue of escape as a matter which would affect every man
in their command. Could the successful escape of a
handful of prisoners justify the death of many left
behind? The answer to this question resulted in the SRO
policy by 1970 of definitely discouraging escape
attempts. Unplanned escapes were strictly against the
decision of most SROs. Hence, organization based on the
authority of the SRO and elaborate communication of
orders and policy statements inhibited escape. Dramesi
(1975) also reveals that men like himself were influenced
and ultimately controlled from attempting escapes through
co-optation (formal recognition by being included in
committees and special task forces) . But what truly
explains why such men as Dramesi complied with SRO orders
which contradicted their values?
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First and foremost, Dramesi and other prisoners who
desired blatantly active resistance recognized a large
role of authority in the SRO. In the words of Coker
(1974) , "A military man should always follow orders"
(p. 45) . These men were so well socialized to the mili-
tary that the role of authority was accepted even when
they perceived it to be in conflict with internalized
values. An example of this acceptance is given by
Dramesi (1975, pp. 235-236) when his cellblock commander
ordered him to remain in the cell for two weeks with no
washing or shaving and not to take part in any formal
activities in the cell. One could reasonably argue that
such a punishment went beyond the legal prescriptions as
outlined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Never-
theless, Dramesi' s behavior was compliance; he accepted
the punishment. The role of authority as Dramesi saw it
permitted the SRO this latitude; to resist this authority
in this situation might discredit Dramesi after release
and such a threat of future punishment held enough power
over Dramesi to induce the control of his behavior.
Later Dramesi (1975) described the tension of this
dilemma as "the real hell of Hanoi" (pp. 223-236)
.
Whether any prisoner of war was court-martialed or
brought to trial after his release in 1973 is not at
issue here. What really was important is that hard-core
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resisters perceived that such actions were within the
latitude of the formal authority structure. Hence,
future rewards and punishments were the means by which
authority controlled these men.
As one might guess, there were also a few prisoners
of war that were not only weak resisters but also refused
to comply with SRO orders. Dramesi (1975, p. 181)
reports that the men in the Desert Inn ate their food
during the hunger strike of 1970 at Little Vegas. The
antiwar group at the Plantation in 1971 was so against
the SRO that they became outcasts from their fellow
prisoners. What explains their deviance? If hard-core
resisters perceived the SRO's authority to be so broad,
could not the behavior of those who refused to comply
with SRO orders be interpreted in a similar fashion?
The difference or critical variable was how much latitude
the individual perceived the SRO to have over him. In
other words, what could the SRO legally and morally ask
of a subordinate in a prisoner-of-war situation? Com-
mander G. Wilbur, who made a strong stand against the
legality of the war as a prisoner of war, stated his
interpretation of this problem:
Each person has to look at it and decide whether
the order is legal. A senior officer can't order
me to rob a bank for instance. I know robbing a
bank is illegal. Strict authoritarianism, which
goes on in the military, we just can't buy.

91
"Forward march right over the wall" sounds great
in textbooks. But, when it comes time to applying
these things in real life, you have to listen to
what you're told and try to apply it to the legal
and moral situation you're in. (Rowen, 1973,
p. 165)
What Commander Wilbur did not address in the above
interview was to what degree the North Vietnamese influ-
enced his decision to protest the war. He reports that
he was not tortured, but that he gave unclassified infor-
mation to the North Vietnamese. Thus, by his own admis-
sion Commander Wilbur gave the enemy information which
was obtained in many instances by the pain of torture
from other prisoners. Since the role expectation and
socialization processes were similar for all military
men, some other theory must be explored to explain this
deviant behavior.
The theory . L. Festinger's (1957) theory of cogni-
tive dissonance has produced a multitude of experiments
and discussion over its use or overuse. Basically,
dissonance can be defined as "a state of tension that
occurs whenever an individual simultaneously holds two
cognitions . . . that are psychologically inconsistent"
(Aronson, 1972, p. 92). The application of dissonance
theory to this study focuses on the threat or use of
punishment and its effect on behavior and attitude
change. Such effects have been explored in a number of
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educational situations (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963;
Freedman, 1963, 1965; Sears, Whiting, Nowlis, & Smith,
1959) . Aronson (1972) summarizes the findings of this
research:
The less severe the threat, the less external
justification; the less the external justifica-
tion, the greater the need for internal justifi-
cation. Allowing people the opportunity to
construct their own internal justification can
be a long step toward helping them develop a
permanent set of values. (p. 120)
The application of the theory . Since Commander
Wilbur's behavior was in conflict with the expected role
he had been trained to perform, tension builds up and
could be relieved by changing either his attitude or his
behavior. The weight of experimental work done by social
psychologists supports an interpretation that Wilbur's
mild treatment in relation to others (no torture) com-
bined with his initially weak resistance produced a
tension which made it much easier to change the attitude
than the behavior already set upon the course of semi-
cooperation with the North Vietnamese. A small attitude
change at the outset of Wilbur's incarceration increased
the probability that his behavior would continue in the
direction first begun. Aronson (1972) calls this phenome-
non "escalation" (p. 105). Hence, Commander Wilbur was
able to so narrowly define the latitude of the SRO as to
make the authority of this role irrelevant to the
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important questions concerning the conduct of prisoners
of war. In brief, since Commander Wilbur had developed
internal tension (cognitive dissonance) from his initial
behavior, he had to redefine or reconstruct the social
order to better fit his behavior. Thus, his attitude
toward the applicability and relevance of the military
authority of rank changed to support individualistic
behavior. The SRO had the authority to tell him when to
report to work but could not deny him the right to write
his congressman about the "cruel and illegal" war our
country was waging (Rowen, 1973, p. 165).
The Concept of Uncertainty
The absence or presence of physical punishment can
also be analyzed in terms of uncertainty. Those who
faced torture lived in constant uncertainty, never know-
ing who would be next and what the North Vietnamese
would want this time. "Just about the time you were
dropping off to sleep, the jingle of keys would drive
pure terror through your heart" (McGrath, 1975, p. 90)
.
In this situation of high uncertainty due to exogenous
factors, the role of authority was expanded by subordi-
nates in an effort to evade personally defining the dis-
cretion of what an individual could say or do for the
North Vietnamese. According to Thompson (1967), "When
the individual believes that his cause/effect resources
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are inadequate to the uncertainty, he will seek to evade
discretion" (p. 120). Hence, when physical torture or
the explicit threat of such force coerced a prisoner to
yield to North Vietnamese demands, the prisoner could
return to his fellow prisoners of war and regain the
flight of resistance through their help and confirmation.
The role of authority supported and often directed such
activity. But when torture or the explicit threat of
such force was not present, a prisoner of war did not
face such a high degree of uncertainty, which when
coupled to tensions of cognitive dissonance, produced in
their perception enough cause/effect resources to cope
with their own situation. Thus, weak resisters were
able to create a self-justification in which the role of
authority had no legitimate claim to control their
"rights of free speech." In the final analysis, the
number of men who fell into such thinking were a small
handful compared to the many who sought "strong leader-
ship" (Rowen, 1973, p. 248). Yet, examination of deviant
behavior and attitude change illuminates how applicable
theoretical concepts of cognitive dissonance and uncer-
tainty can be to organization problems.
Above all, these concepts reveal that in times of
great uncertainty, people look for strong leadership
based on a legitimate source of power; namely, authority
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of the SRO in a prisoner-of-war situation. Organic
structure is complex and involves high participation
whereas mechanistic structure of the more traditional
bureaucracy simplifies lines of control. Since high
uncertainty (the presence of torture) created much con-
fusion within an individual, mechanistic structure
within the c mization was most appropriate to the
environment. Although the organization of prisoners of
war in Hanoi was highly mechanistic at first, as the use
of torture and the explicit threat of such force sub-
sided, more participation and greater influence by
subordinates resulted. When the North Vietnamese again
resorted to torture, the organizational structure became
more mechanistic. Subordinates tended to look not for
influence in the organization but instead wanted to be
told exactly what to do. Hence, the degree of uncer-
tainty helps to explain the zone in which subordinates
view that authority as a legitimate claim to control.
This zone is not a given one but expands and contracts
over time in relation to the amount of uncertainty the
members perceive the organization is facing. In Hanoi
prisoners of war organized behind the authority of the
SRO, but the interpersonal inputs from focal persons to
role senders definitely changed with the amount of
uncertainty the organization faced. Still the critical
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hub around which the wheel of the organization turned
was the role of authority.
Summary
The role of authority has been shown as the major
influence and controlling variable of prisoner-of-war
behavior. In the scenario of a role episode, the role
was sent through the Code of Conduct and socialization
processes to focal persons who in turn received and
performed behavior. The reception and ultimate compli-
ance to the expected role were examined in terms of
uncertainty (torture) . The more the uncertainty, the
more emphasis was placed on the role of authority. Those
who refused to adhere to a wide interpretation of the
authority structure were found to have experienced
little, if any, physical torture.
The theory of cognitive dissonance was used to
explain attitude changes which influenced behavior of a
few prisoners who deviated from the expected norms. A
wide majority who sought a broad definition of formal
authority were seeking a social construction of reality
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967) that would impose rigid
limits on their behavior. This expectation once estab-
lished was hard to ignore, but when conditions did seem
to improve with larger groups at Camp Unity, more partic-
ipation and influence on organizational policy by lower
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ranking members were observed. Thus, the more the uncer-
tainty, the more rigidly mechanistic became the structure
of the prisoner-of-war organization in Hanoi.
When an SRO issued an order, he obtained in many
cases more than compliance because hardships had solidi-
fied his followers into a communal bond. Positive
identification (referent power) and internalization of
the role of authority (legitimate power) made the prison-
ers more cohesive and served as the primary means for
control in the organization. Despite the many arguments
and differences of opinion, most prisoners of war in
Hanoi were united behind a wide latitude of authority
for the command structure. Such a definition was the




THE CENTRALITY OF POSITION
The preceding two chapters have described the
patterns of communication and the significance of the
role of formal authority to the mechanistic organization
of prisoners of war in Hanoi. Although the authority of
the command structure was seen as the primary variable
in influencing and controlling the behavior of prisoners,
other factors had influence on and at times control of
behavior. Individual characteristics such as personal-
ity, attractiveness, and time in service often were
influential factors. If a prisoner had endured a great
amount of torture such as Colonel Risner (1973) , then he
gained credibility and thus influence in addition to his
rank. Some prisoners had shot down enemy aircraft
before their capture, and this prior war experience
tended to induce respect from others, and thus influence.
However, in the everyday life of the prisoner-of-war
situation, the effects of these individualistic and
behavioral characteristics were rather small and cer-
tainly ephemeral. Even the glory of an unsuccessful
escape attempt did not have a lasting influence or con-
trol on resistance policy (Dramesi, 1975). However, the
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structural element of centrality of position was observed
to be not only a valuable resource for individual satis-
faction but also a means for making continual inputs and
influencing those in authority.
This chapter seeks to answer several questions con-
cerning the concept of centrality of position. Specif-
ically, did centrality of position (physical or social)
have influence in the prisoner-of-war organization in
Hanoi? Or was the level of activity more of an influence
than centrality? Did the level of activity change in
relation to changes in physical or social locations? Was
an individual more prone to participate in communication
and organizational efforts if he occupied a central posi-
tion? And finally, did social centrality have more
influence than physical centrality?
The Influence of Centrality
Definition of the Concept
The concept of centrality can be viewed in two ways:
physical location and proximity to the decision-maker.
The former was directly related to physical access to
information. For example, in the Thunderbird of Little
Vegas the cells in the center of the row could communi-
cate with their two neighbors and across the passageway
(see Figure 3, p. 44). The cells at the end of the
passageway could only communicate with one neighbor.
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Thus, physical location in the center of the Thunderbird
gave a prisoner more immediate access to information and
other prisoners.
Proximity to the decision-maker concerns the social
space of the organization. If in the above example, the
SRO was located in Thunderbird #3, Cell #2 would have
more centrality than the other central cells because all
information on which decisions were based had to flow
through this cell. In the experimental work by Bavelas
(1968) and Leavitt (1958) , the concept of authority was
not present. If the chain pattern was used in this expe-
iment with a military hierarchy, the position with the
highest rank might gather the information and make the
decision. (Consider Figure 6.) If the SRO was in the
end position #1, information might pass from one end to
the other before a solution could be reached. The posi-
tion next to the SRO, Cell #2, would involve much access
to information in such a pattern and thus have more
centrality in the social order than the physically more
central position of Cell #3.12 3 4 5
SRO < Informational Flow
Figure 6
Physical versus social centrality
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Because of the paucity of informational sources and
the uses which information served in forming a viable
resistance posture, access to information became a prized
resource for prisoners. Most information concerning
interrogations and actions by the North Vietnamese was
accepted at face value. In other words, the credibility
of the reporting prisoner was rarely questioned, and so
this source of power does not fit into the five cate-
gories of French and Raven (196 3) who "distinguish
between expert power based on the credibility of and
informational influence which is based on characteristics
of the stimulus" (p. 2 69) . The influence and power of
information were major assets in resisting the North
Vietnamese propaganda efforts. The more central the
physical or social location, the more access to informa-
tion a prisoner could gain. Such access was most crit-
ical when prisoners lived in pairs or alone. Thus, the
informational influence from centrality of position was
most apparent in the communication at Little Vegas in
1970. More specifically, the system of tapping in the
Thunderbird can serve to describe the difference between
physical and social centrality as well as to show the
significance of activity. Figure 7 depicts a closeup of
the Thunderbird with the flow and pattern of communica-
tion before and after Colonel Risner's arrival as SRO
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Closeup of Thunderbird' s informational flow and pattern
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and is useful in understanding the application of this
concept.
Application of the Concept
When Thunderbird #3 was inhabited by the cellblock
commander, it was both physically and socially the most
central cell in this building. The commander was in the
fork of a "Y" pattern, and any piece of news or contact
with prisoners in another subunit was passed to Cell #3.
Thus, Cells #2 and #8 had the next level of centrality.
The prisoners in these two cells generally expended more
time in communication, but there were some exceptions
which help to shed some light on the nature of this
communication. Under this organization at one time a
prisoner in Cell #7 was a close friend of a man in Cell
#6 whom he had known in a previous prison; these two were
avid communicators. Their activity in communication was
so great that it sometimes confused communication
attempts by others and often made the guards suspicious.
On one occasion the cellblock commander passed the order
to these men to "hold down" their tapping, especially at
night when other prisoners were not maintaining a lookout
for approaching guards. Other prisoners thought that
their overuse of tapping would lead to detection and
threaten the communication system in the building. Thus,
activity in and of itself did not lead to organizational
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influence; the key was that communication activity had
to be organizationally relevant. And the relevant posi-
tion of power and control in the above case was in Cell
#3 to which information flowed and from which decisions
were made. Another example vividly portrays this point.
Around November 20, 197 0, the routine of the prison
changed, and no one was allowed to wash or exercise in
the courtyard. Speculation grew over the possible cause
of such a situation. Then word reached the Thunderbird
from another subunit that a specially trained United
States unit had attempted a rescue of the prisoners of
war at Son Tay, approximately 20 miles east of Hanoi.
Although the prison at Son Tay had been empty, the idea
of such a rescue attempt lifted spirits among the
prisoners who were now being more closely confined to
small cells. The cellblock commander was one of the
first prisoners to have this news and immediately formu-
lated a plan to protest the restriction to our cells
with no washing and exercise. As could be expected, the
men in Cell #6 were the last to get the word and did not
fully agree with the plan. Since the men in Cell #8 had
been instrumental in advising and making suggestions
about the plan which was adopted, their handling of Cell
#6's objections could be decisive in discrediting these
men before the cellblock commander. The rank and
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longevity of the individuals involved were similar. The
essential difference was the physical and social central-
ity of position which Cell #8 had over Cell #6. In this
case, Cell #8 had more influence on and control of the
organization of resistance in the cellblock than more
peripheral cells. The men in Cell #6 followed the plan,
for they knew how to follow orders. But even more sig-
nificantly, they knew their ideas from a peripheral posi-
tion could never gain influence or control unless those
in more central positions were persuaded to endorse such
views and thus better represent their views as spokesmen.
In the above example, the men in the central positions
had different ideas than those on the end; thus, central-
ity of position was the influence and ultimate control-
ling variable in formulating the resistance plan.
As previously noted, the frequency of intraprison
moves was quite high and aided the dispersal of informa-
tion. When the men of Cell #6 were moved to Cell #7 and
Colonel Risner was placed in Cell #6, the social central-
ity of position was greatly raised for the men in Cell
#7. Figure 7 (p. 102) shows that the physical centrality
of Cell #3 still was great, even without attempts to have
#3 tap directly to Cell #7. The significant result of
such a move was the complete change of the social order
in the building. The men in Cell #7, who felt a great
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need to unite the building and entire prison in some form
of common activity, now had the chance to make their
inputs directly to the SRO. Knowing the colonel to be
religious, they suggested a time of prayer be established
in order to unite all the prisoners in some form of
spiritual meditation. Colonel Risner was receptive to
this suggestion and stressed how important such action
would be for those prisoners who still had no cellmates.
A plan of action with an appropriate signal to initiate
and conclude the evening quiet time was implemented.
Another significant change occurred with the above
move. Before Colonel Risner' s arrival, the SRO in the
Stardust and the Thunderbird cellblock commander had
issued stern orders to refuse any task (painting, writ-
ing, or tape recording) which the North Vietnamese
requested of a prisoner. The men who had moved to Cell
#7 from Cell #6 found direct refusal of the North Viet-
namese requests most difficult; they preferred deception
and more passive methods of resistance. For instance,
when asked to paint pictures of "camp scenes" (the term
used by the North Vietnamese to describe prison condi-
tions) , one man in Cell #7 had drawn a bolted door with
a peep window through which an angry guard was peering.
The caption of this picture was "Keep Shilent!" After
the former SRO's order of direct refusal, these men
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could no longer humor themselves with such endeavor, but
with the newly arrived SRO as their neighbor they had the
opportunity to make their viewpoint known. Within a
short time after Colonel Risner had said that all former
SRO orders were to remain in effect, a new policy state-
ment was issued which stated that the goal of each
prisoner of war was to refuse giving anything "useful"
to the North Vietnamese. Thus, active and passive
methods had their place in the resistance effort; each
prisoner had to decide which method was best suited to
his own makeup. The influence of the men in Cell #7 and
their interpretation of what the SRO said to others
cannot be overlooked. The social centrality of their
position was the crucial variable which allowed them to
have such influence. When the men in Cell #7 became the
direct link to the SRO, their activity became organiza-
tionally relevant. Furthermore, their influence and
ultimately their control of the organization greatly
increased through their ability to use the power invested
in the formal authority of the SRO.
The above example is one of many cases in which
centrality of position created influence and control of
the organization . As previously mentioned, the link at
Camp Unity to the SRO was through a civilian, E. Brace.
In this case, the ability to edit and interpret had to
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be employed frequently to condense and transfer informa-
tion. Because of his access to information and to the
colonels, Brace accrued informal power and influence. So
intense was the buildup of this power that one of the
men in his group suggested that a military man should
perform the communication duties which Brace was doing so
well. Although this prisoner personally liked Brace, he
became increasingly dissatisfied in his peripheral posi-
tion where he maintained lookout and distracted the
guards. The spark that ignited this jealousy was the
centrality of position Brace occupied and the influence
it commanded. This dissatisfaction supports findings on
the more peripheral the position, the less the satisfac-
tion (Bavelas, 1968; Leavitt, 1958). Similar incidents
at the Plantation support the above emphasis on the
influence of centrality and the dissatisfaction in
peripheral positions. Given the influence of centrality
of position on the organization, another issue needs to
be explored. Were effort and interest in communication
related to the centrality of position?
Effort in Communication and
the Centrality Concept
When the North Vietnamese cut the doors of the wash
stalls at Little Vegas, they gave occupants of the
Golden Nugget a view of any prisoner in the west side of
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the wash stalls. Soon the separate buildings had a
common link with other buildings through the Golden
Nugget which served as the central hub of a wheel pat-
tern. When Brace and the author occupied Golden Nugget
#3, they spent entire mornings and afternoons on their
knees or standing on a bucket in order to communicate.
Commander Stockdale, the acting SRO, and Lieutenant
Colonel Hughes were moved into Golden Nugget #1, but
their efforts in communication were dampened by the
latter 's reported concern over detection. Later in Camp
Unity, these former cellmates set up their beds at the
opposite ends of the large cell in order "to get as far
apart as possible" (Dramesi, 1975, p. 192). Hence,
Golden Nugget #3 did the bulk of communicating with men
in the bath area and later passed the most important
information to the SRO in Golden Nugget #1 at the safest
time for communication.
The flow of information was fairly constant and
concerned interrogation strategies, tactics, possible
riot plans, and news about several prisoners in poor
health. A question constantly posed to any SRO was "What
can I do?" Thus, the generation of alternatives and the
probabilities of outcomes were an essential aspect of
communication to the SRO. The physical location of
Golden Nugget #3 gave much information to Brace and the
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author before the SRO was their neighbor, but the social
position or proximity to the SRO provided insight into
the many questions and issues confronting the leadership
of this organization and presented the opportunity to
make suggestions. When Brace and the author were moved
into the Thunderbird, they both felt an immediate loss
of access to information. Moreover, it was perceived
that any important idea or suggestion from this cell
stood little chance of reaching, let alone influencing,
those in authority. Now Brace and the author were only
a cog at the end of a chain instead of the hub in a
wheel. This dissatisfaction not only supports findings
on satisfaction in positions of communication networks
but also suggests that the more influence a person per-
ceives in a position, the more interest and effort this
person will display in organizational activity.
The sequel to the above case adds clarity to this
issue. Commander Stockdale was returned to the Stardust
while Lieutenant Colonel Hughes remained in Golden Nugget
#3. Although he had never communicated avidly or fre-
quently in the past, Hughes began to pass information
from men in the bath stalls. Since he was looking out
the window, he could be easily seen by both the prisoners
and any guard. It was not long before a guard unexpect-
edly emerged from the Thunderbird and caught Hughes in
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the act of flashing information to the wash area. The
North Vietnamese asked many questions and then boarded
up his windows which already had steel bars and bamboo
screening over them. Hughes then found a peephole in
the door and continued communication from the floor.
Such effort supports Mechanic's (1962) hypothesis that
"there is a direct relationship between the amount of
effort a person is willing to exert in an area and the
power he can command" (p. 359) , or at least the influ-
ence the person thinks he or she can exert. After the
move to the Thunderbird, Brace and the author were com-
municating at most two hours per day, while Hughes was
spending his entire day in communication attempts from
the Golden Nugget. Therefore, an additional relationship
between location and effort became noticeable in the
prisoner-of-war organization in Hanoi; the more central
the position, the more effort a person is willing to
exert in organizational activity.
During the upheaval of the communication purge in
the summer of 1970, Brace and the author were returned
to the former cell in the Golden Nugget. Perhaps the
North Vietnamese reasoned that Brace was so old (his
missing front teeth and prematurely gray hair added years
to his appearance) and the author so young that neither
could do much harm from this cell. However, given the
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concept of centrality, one could predict that the indi-
viduals were not a key variable. Subsequent events
supported this viewpoint. The guards became so preoccu-
pied with preventing tapping that flashing and mute code
(McGrath, 1975, p. 41) continued all morning and after-
noon between the Golden Nugget and the wash area. Men
living in adjacent cells passed messages about irregular
guard behavior via the Golden Nugget when they went to
wash. Overuse of this method inevitably led to detection
by the guards who changed their routine or pattern of
behavior. Infraction of the no-communication regulation
was reported, and punishment of no wash and shave was
quickly determined by the prison management. This
recourse was common for minor violations (such as an
improper bow) but light for communicating. The North
Vietnamese saw power in rank and did not suspect the
influence lower participants could exert on other prison-
ers. In this example, the serious tone and intent of
the work provided the Americans with a unified system
for rioting at a given Vietnamese phrase and also spread
the plan for a prisonwide hunger strike.
Upon returning to the United States, former prison-
ers of war were given much recognition and praise.
Several were singled out by the prisoners themselves for
devotion above and beyond the call of duty. Brace was

113
congratulated by many for his fine performance, espe-
cially in the summer of 1970, and was included in several
interviews for television, radio, and magazine articles.
In turn, the author received the Bronze Star with Combat
"V" for establishing and maintaining intracamp communica-
tions. The point behind this recognition is that the
prestige or status could never have been achieved without
the centrality of position. When moved to peripheral
cells, the incentive to communicate was greatly dimin-
ished, and activity in communication usually decreased.
When in central cells, especially cells adjacent to the
SRO, perception of the role as having some influence had
immediate as well as possible long-term benefits. Since
the North Vietnamese did not show as much concern over
infractions of regulations by lower participants, they
could weigh the costs and benefits of communication in a
different ratio than some of the more senior officers.
In the terminology of Thompson (1967) , the "cause/effect
resources" were in a state of fluctuation (p. 118)
.
Influence and power were perceived to lie in central
cells, so relentless efforts were exerted in organiza-
tional activity from central positions. In peripheral
positions, little influence was perceived; less effort




Centrality of Position and
Formal Authority
Centrality of position and formal authority in the
role of the SRO have been shown as great influences and
controlling variables in the organization of prisoners
of war in Hanoi. Several questions remain; namely, did
centrality of position yield more influence and control
than the role of authority? In cases of conflict, which
variable did most to explain subsequent behavior. Be-
cause of the physical and social nature of the centrality
concept, one must be careful to distinguish the two and
see the difference between the influence of social cen-
trality and the role of authority. In other words,
social centrality in the form of proximity to the SRO was
a recognition of formal authority's influence and ulti-
mate control of the organization. Prisoners close to the
SRO often made suggestions and thus influenced SRO deci-
sions. But once the decision came from the SRO, little
if any conflict arose. Although a hunger strike may have
been unpleasant and only followed half-heartedly, most
prisoners obeyed SRO orders (Coker, 1974; Dramesi, 1975,
p. 181) . In short, the role of formal authority was the
ultimate source of power which controlled prisoner
behavior within the organization and often before the
North Vietnamese. However, it must be added that if
the North Vietnamese wanted something badly enough, they

115
could expend the time in torture and get what they
wanted. The influence of the SRO in many cases raised
the cost of such force by the North Vietnamese.
Deviant behavior usually originated from peripheral
positions. For example, in the hunger strike discussed
by Dramesi (1975, p. 181), the non-fasting prisoners in
the Desert Inn were not in routine communication with
the rest of the prison. In fact, several men in the
Desert Inn had threatened to report any intercell commu-
nication to the North Vietnamese. Hence, these men were
not always aware of the internal organization and worked
to keep themselves in such a state. They refused to
recognize the latitude of authority in the SRO position
which other prisoners saw in this position, but in case
the future proved their interpretation incorrect, they
might claim they did not know the SRO policy. Therefore,
in most cases of conflict, the question was centered
squarely on the role of authority; centrality of posi-
tion was not a factor except for its absence.
In several cases prisoners in physically central
locations held vastly different ideas on methods of
resistance from those more senior in rank. When Lieuten-
ant Colonel Hughes became the cellblock commander of the
Thunderbird, he set an example of unpredictable behavior
by shouting short phrases such as "Hey! Heyl Santa Fe!"
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at any time of day or night. His reported intention was
to raise the morale of his men, but the prisoners in the
physically central cell saw his actions as a danger not
only to himself but also to communication for all in the
Thunderbird. Although Hughes never ordered others to
follow his example, word quickly spread in the communica-
tion network that he was acting alone and all other
prisoners were to continue their normal routine. The
latter part of this message was added by the men in the
physically central cell; it was their way of controlling
those who now might wish to join in the colonel's shout
program. The significant result of their action was
that no other prisoners, even those who supported such
emotional outbursts, joined the colonel in shouting out
slogans. The men in the central cell effectively con-
trolled other prisoners, but only by adding to the cell-
block commander's message. In short, through the role
of authority, their views were legitimized; through their
physical centrality of position, they were able to dis-
seminate a policy which controlled others under the guise
that such policy was emanating from formal authority.
In this case an actual conflict did not exist because
Hughes never expressed a desire for other prisoners to
follow his example. More importantly, a conflict was
avoided by the quick action of accenting Hughes' own
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explanation of his behavior and adding something to this
message which kept others from joining these erratic
outbursts.
In Camp Unity, Colonel Hughes continued his out-
bursts and unpredictable behavior in the large cell, but
now he was not the cell commander. Dramesi (1975, pp.
217-219) describes how Hughes' shouting resulted in con-
frontation and torture for Hughes himself, but reaction
to this torture reveals how much formal authority could
control prisoner behavior. The cell commander did not
approve of Hughes and ordered his men to do nothing.
Dramesi and other prisoners felt that even "a crazy
American" deserved more than this inaction, but in the
end no action was taken to protest the torture of Hughes
whose cries were easily heard by all his former cell-
mates (Dramesi, 1975, p. 219). No matter how much influ-
ence, or in Mechanic's (1962) terms informal power, an
individual had within a cell or cellblock, the final
control of organizational activity lay in the hands of
the most senior man. The role of formal authority was
the bedrock of all organization by prisoners of war in
Hanoi. Although many individualistic characteristics at
times had an influence on and control of the organiza-




The concept of centrality was consistent with the
above interpretation because social proximity to the SRO
was indeed a recognition of formal authority's role.
When social and physical centrality coincided in the
same position, there were fewer linkages to maintain in
the system and SRO orders were more quickly disseminated.
Structural elements, not individualistic characteristics,
explain how this organization worked so well despite the
adverse conditions. Such effectiveness tends to support
Dubin's findings (1959) on radial linkage being the most
efficient pattern which Caplow (1964) found to be "inter-
esting but essentially unsupported" (p. 261) . Colonel
Risner's move into Thunderbird #6 supports such emphasis
because when Thunderbird #3 could tap directly to Thun-
derbird #7, the time expended in communication was
greatly reduced, and SRO policy was more effectively
understood. Several prisoners mentioned at this time
that it would have been more "convenient" if the North
Vietnamese had moved Colonel Risner into Thunderbird #3.
Experiences from tap code communication in several
prisons showed that when the SRO was in the most physi-
cally central location, efficiency through the network
and effectiveness in more cohesive resistance behavior
resulted
.
Another example of the increase in efficiency and
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effectiveness through reduction of linkages is found in
the procedures of written communication. When speciali-
zation of written notes was attempted, much time and
effort were exerted in trying to assign central cells
the task of preparing notes to other subunits. For
example, in several buildings at the Plantation, the
task of writing notes fell to prisoners in the most cen-
tral cell of a basic chain pattern. In fact, Colonel
Guy assigned the writing job at first to men in the most
central cell. The intention of this effort was to reduce
time of communication and also increase accuracy by
eliminating needless stages or relay stations.
Centrality of position was a powerful factor of
influence in the prisoner-of-war organization. When
combined with the role of authority, this concept of
centrality explains much of the control in the resistance
efforts of the prisoners. Moreover, those prisoners who
were located in the central positions not only were able
to accrue "informal power" through access to persons and
information (Mechanic, 1962), but also were able to
influence and at times control organizational activity
by their relationships with those in formal authority
positions. One of the clearest evidences of this influ-
ence was the great satisfaction in central positions and
the dissatisfaction with peripheral cells. Although
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these concepts have been proposed and tested in labora-
tory settings, little evidence has been brought forward
to support the theory from everyday life. The unique
conditions of the prisons in North Vietnam have given
this study a rich background to explore these concepts,
but the question of how to apply these concepts to a
business of social setting remains unanswered. The final
chapter will summarize and shed some light on the appli-




Unlike previous wars, American prisoners of war
during the war in Vietnam were isolated or in very small
groups until 1971 or until the end of their captivity
approached. Communication was strictly forbidden. Yet
having learned important lessons from the Korean War,
the American prisoners of war relied heavily on their
fellow prisoners for support and strength to resist.
For example, in the Korean War once prisoners "had col-
laborated even a little they were ostracized by their
buddies, thus losing the support of the group" (Schein,
1958, p. 324). In Vietnam, prisoners of war applied the
notion that never falling was impossible and that once
having fallen, the prisoner needed the group as wings in
order to regain the flight of resistance. Since Ameri-
cans were kept from looking at— let alone talking to
—
one another, the task of organization and group support
was made most difficult.
Numerous press conferences in 1973 and several pub-
lications (Coker, 1974, Dramesi, 1975; McGrath, 1975;
Risner, 1973; Rowen , 1973) revealed that a viable commu-
nication network did exist and was a valuable sustaining
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force for many returned prisoners. Yet no study has
analytically elaborated how the prisoners of war built
and maintained their organization. This study not only
describes the communication system of three prisons in
Hanoi but also analyzes what variables influenced and at
times controlled the attitudes and behavior of these
prisoners of war. Moreover, a theoretical framework was
developed from several works on organizational theory
which raised key issues for this study. In this way
this research demonstrates which bits and pieces of
organizational theory were found by trial and error to
work in the harsh conditions of the North Vietnamese
prisons.
The American combatant was at the outset of the
Vietnam War better prepared for incarceration and brutal
treatment because of the Code of Conduct and socializa-
tion processes. The first and most sacred rule was to
trust your fellow prisoner and help him to resist.
American leadership refused to remain isolated and
communicated by tapping on walls and passing secret notes
in spite of the risk of detection and harsh punishment.
Each prison was organized into sections with "comm block"
commanders and one SRO who held the ultimate role of
authority. This role was determined solely by whoever
was the most senior ranking officer willing to take
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command. The structure of such an organization was more
mechanistic than organic.
When the prisoners lived alone or in pairs, the
function of communication was basically to provide inter-
action and thus was a means for retaining a healthy self-
image in a social order. When the North Vietnamese
changed this structure so that there were larger groups,
the function of communication shifted to an emphasis on
resistance policies as manifested by an analysis of the
informational content of messages in the system. This
finding is in contrast to Tannenbaum (1968, p. 34) who
describes a one-way relationship as "functions determine
structure." Because the size of the groups was beyond
the control of the prisoners, changes in structure often
produced changes in the functions within the prisoner-of-
war organization. Such a finding might be applicable to
an organization which is so heavily impacted by exogenous
forces that structural changes are dictated to the organ-
ization rather than by the organization.
A key concept of this study is the emphasis of the
role of authority. Peabody (1964) noted that authority
increases in times of crisis. This research has shown
that the mechanistic structure of the prisoner-of-war
organization became more mechanistic in times of increas-
ing uncertainty when the North Vietnamese resorted to
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torture. Such an observation is in keeping with Barnard
(1938) , Simon (1957) , and Thompson (1967) who perceived
authority as a zone of acceptance. Thompson (1967)
proposed that the expansion of this zone was in truth an
evasion of discretion by individuals who thought their
cause/effect resources to be inadequate to cope with the
uncertainty. Such was the case in Hanoi where prisoners
of war looked for strong leadership and expanded the
role of SRO authority in times of great uncertainty.
This study has shown that such a strict mechanistic
structure can and still does work under certain condi-
tions where roles of authority are a foundation upon
which an organization is built.
Another core idea of this research concerns the
rise of informal power. All too often social scientists
become so behaviorally orientated that informal power is
explained by personality, charisma, and other personal
characteristics. Of course, these variables often are
important, but in empirical studies such as McCleery
(1968, 1972) and Scheff (1961), personality and individ-
ual characteristics were not the source of power.
Instead position or location which gave groups access to
people and information was the source of power.
Mechanic (1962) hypothesized that the more central
a position, the more power that position can command.
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This study of prisoner-of-war organization has revealed
how distinct patterns of communication resulted in
physical and social centrality of position. Those men
closest to the SRO occupied socially central positions
and were seen to exert considerable influence on and at
times control of the organization. The more central the
position, the more activity was observed in that posi-
tion. The more central the position, the more satisfac-
tion was experienced in that position. In contrast, the
more peripheral the position, the more dissatisfaction
was expressed in that position. Such conclusions were
hypothesized and supported experimentally by both
Bavelas (1968) and Leavitt (1958) . Moreover, the effort
and interest in participating in the organization were
observed to be directly related to the amount of influ-
ence one could exert. Therefore, the more central the
position, the more effort and interest were found in the
occupant of that position. A major contribution of this
study to the existing body of literature comes from
examples of how centrality of position led to informal
power, influence, and at times control of the organiza-
tion. Such a concept might have been at work in the
Nixon Administration's organization during the crisis
of the "Watergate" affair and may explain how some of
the abuses of presidential power occurred.
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This research has also shown that when the prisoners
had a choice, they invariably tried to reduce the number
of linkages in their communication patterns. Such a
desire was seen in efforts to tap across the passageway
in the Thunderbird section of Little Vegas and in the
selection of personnel to write notes in the Plantation.
The fewer the linkages, the less chance of omission or
misinterpretation of information in the relay process
was found. This conclusion about minimum linkages is
valuable preliminary evidence to support the hypothesis
presented in both Dubin (1959) and Guetzkow and Dill
(1957) on the relationship between the number of linkages
and the efficiency and effectiveness of the group to
solve problems.
Above all, prisoners of war were united in misfor-
tune and place. They suffered under incessant hammer
blows of adversity which gave them a common sense of
injustice. Through the covert communication system,
close personal and emotionally deep bonds were estab-
lished upon open and authentic expression of feelings.
It was this sense of fellowship which supported the
community and fostered an additional respect for author-
ity which sustained the American prisoner of war through
the long and frustrating Vietnam War. Informal power
did arise in this system, but it often was the oil which
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lubricated the mechanistic machinery of a military hier-
archy. Personality and other personal characteristics
played a part in influencing the organization, but the
most pervasive underlying and yet subtle source of
informal power was the centrality of position. Still,
the primary variable which controlled the organization
was the role of authority as seen in the SRO. This
position was the helmsman of the ship, the master of
their fates. There can be no understanding of the pris-
oner-of-war organization in Hanoi without a clear concept
of how this role impinged upon each prisoner. At times
the SRO role was filled by men of great leadership and
moral example, and at other times the SRO role was occu-
pied by a reluctant performer who in the past had not
chosen to take part in the organization. But this
authority did not attach itself to the person; rather it
was an office on which the remaining social order was
constructed. The role of authority and the sense of a
community sustained by a communication system were the
bedrock upon which the survival of the nearly unanimous
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I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces
which guard my country and our way of life. I am
prepared to give my life in their defense.
II
I will never surrender of my own free will. If in
command, I will never surrender my men while they still
have the means to resist.
Ill
If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means
available. I will make every effort to escape and aid
others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor
special favors from the enemy.
IV
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my
fellow prisones. I will give no information or take
part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades,
If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will
obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and
will back them up in every way.
V
When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am
bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date
of birth. I will evade answering further questions to
the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or
written statements disloyal to my country and its allies
or harmful to their cause.
VI
I will never forget that I am an American fighting man,
responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the prin-
ciples which made my country free. I will trust in my





Many accounts by former prisoners of war from
Vietnam credit the communications system as a major
factor which helped them survive. However, no one has
analyzed how an organization was developed and maintained
in the prisons of North Vietnam, where communication
between groups of prisoners was strictly forbidden. This
study analytically elaborates the author's experiences as
a prisoner of war in Hanoi and thus seeks to answer how
this organization was developed and maintained. Proposi-
tions drawn from organizational theory were used as a
theoretical framework to ask critical questions of the
author's experiences. From this process, the role of
authority in the office of the senior ranking officer
was found to be the key variable which influenced and at
times controlled the behavior and attitudes of prisoners.
Specific geometric patterns within the communication
system resulted in geographic and social centrality
which was also found to be a major and yet subtle influ-
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